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It is no secret that large law firms are struggling in their efforts to retain attorneys
of color. This is despite two decades of aggressive tracking of demographic rates,
mandates from clients to improve demographic diversity, and the implementation of
a variety of diversity efforts within large law firms. In part, law firm retention
efforts are stymied by the reality that elite, large law firms require some level of
attrition to function properly under the predominant business model. This reality,
however, does not explain why firms have so much difficulty retaining attorneys of
color—in particular black and Hispanic attorneys.
And yet, there may be a relatively simple and low-cost set of incentives that law firm
management and the legal profession can put in place to encourage black and
Hispanic attorneys to remain at large law firms at higher rates. This Article draws
on traditional theories of “the firm” and modern day understandings of workplace
discrimination and applies them to the retention problem in large law firms. It
argues that by incentivizing equity partners in large firms, who are overwhelmingly
white males, to instill greater loyalty in black and Hispanic attorneys, firms can
solve a large portion of their retention problem. As equity partners invest more time
mentoring black and Hispanic attorneys, they will develop a sense of loyalty to the
firm that will decrease the speed and frequency that attorneys of color exit the firm.
Firms can then begin Retaining Color.
INTRODUCTION
[S]mall features of social situations can have massive effects on peo-
ple’s behavior.1
[I]t may be possible to encourage recategorization such that people from
different groups conceive of themselves as common members of a more
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inclusive group, and thus see themselves, at least temporarily, as all
ingroup members.2
No one disputes that large law firms have difficulty retaining at-
torneys of color, particularly black and Hispanic attorneys. The
conventional wisdom is that these problems will persist until law
firms make major structural changes to the typical large law firm
business model and assignment process. But what if a major struc-
tural overhaul is not needed or is incapable of completely fixing the
retention problem? What if, instead, the retention rates of attorneys
of color at elite, large law firms could be increased through a series
of modest incentives, rather than mandates, aimed at white men?
The question is whether the context in which white males at
elite, large law firms make decisions can be organized in a manner
that will alter their behavior without mandating that they take par-
ticular actions. Can the choice architects at law firms—those
responsible “for organizing the context in which people make deci-
sions”3—incentivize behavior by white men that will result in
increasing the retention rates of attorneys of color within the firm?
This Article suggests that they can.
Part I provides an overview of the large law firm business model,
drawing on the seminal work of Wilkins and Gulati4 and the effects
of the Great Recession on this model. It then explains that, within
elite, large law firms, the model works only if high rates of attrition
occur within the associate attorney ranks, even after the recession,
and highlights the different rates of attrition between white males
and other demographic groups.
Part II outlines the crux of the retention problem in modern day
elite, large law firms. It begins by describing the efforts undertaken
by client-corporations to pressure law firms into increasing their
demographic diversity and explains why these efforts have not re-
sulted in more success. In light of this market failure, it then
highlights three distinct challenges law firms must address in de-
signing efforts aimed at eliminating retention rate disparities
between white attorneys and black and Hispanic attorneys. It then
relies on Hirschman’s 1970 work, which discusses the roles of exit,
2. Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Addressing Contemporary Racism: The Common
Ingroup Identity Model, in 53 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION, MOTIVATIONAL ASPECTS OF PREJUDICE
AND RACISM 111, 115 (Cynthia Willis-Esqueda ed., 2008) (emphasis omitted).
3. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See David B Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate
Law Firms? An Institutional Analysis, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 493 (1996) [hereinafter Wilkins & Gu-
lati, An Institutional Analysis].
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voice, and loyalty within firms5 and the work of Wilkins and Gulati6
to demonstrate that the current law firm model results in a system
where the concept of “loyalty to the firm” is instilled in only a select
few associates deemed the “Superstars.” Those with no loyalty to the
firm exit quickly when they encounter dissatisfaction instead of ex-
ercising their voice in an attempt to motivate the firm to alleviate
the source of their dissatisfaction. The different rates in attrition
between white males and other demographic groups suggest that
the percentage of attorneys being instilled with loyalty to the firm is
greater for white men than for black and Hispanic attorneys.
Thus, in Part III, the Article argues that choice architects at large
law firms and within the legal profession need to engage in an ef-
fort to change the behavior of white males so that they work to
instill more loyalty in associates of other demographic groups, with
a particular focus on black and Hispanic attorneys. The Article fo-
cuses on incentivizing white males because they are the
overwhelming majority of equity partners in law firms.7 In other
words, white men own law firms, and instilling true loyalty in associ-
ates must come from the law firms’ owners. This Article then
provides three such proposals aimed at incentivizing equity part-
ners within elite, large law firms to instill loyalty in black and
Hispanic attorneys:
(1) Law firms should credit time spent on increasing diversity
at the firm towards billable hours’ requirements and for
bonus consideration.
(2) Law firms should increase the demographic diversity in
top management positions within the firm. First, law firms
should designate an equity partner as a Chief Diversity Of-
ficer (CDO) who is responsible for implementing
strategies to improve overall firm demographic diversity.
Second, law firms that have equity partners who are
women and persons of color should ensure that individu-
als from these groups are on the most powerful
committees at the firm—often the executive, manage-
ment, and compensation committees.
5. ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS,
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970) (referring to “the firm” in the “business concern” sense
and not focused on “law firms” in particular).
6. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 520–21.
7. The Demographics of Equity—An Update, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT (Feb. 2013),
http://www.nalp.org/demographics_of_equity_update.
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(3) The legal profession should create a regime for mediating
incidents of bias to help encourage attorneys of color to
use their voice, as opposed to immediately utilizing the
choice of exit, when encountering discriminatory8 events
at the firm.
I. THE STATUS QUO
Elite, large law firms9 have utilized the same basic business model
for over fifty years. Initially, the tournament model10 was explicitly
discriminatory against certain demographic groups—including at-
torneys of color.11 Explicit discrimination is no longer a part of the
model, but the long-term effect of the discrimination can still be
felt in the institutions, as the overwhelming percentage of owners at
8. Please note that an occurrence can be discriminatory without qualifying as actiona-
ble unlawful discrimination. Most of the incidents relevant to this proposal will not be
incidents arising out of hiring, promotion, or termination decisions. Instead, they are the
type of incidents a person might bring in a hostile work environment claim, but a hostile
work environment claim must be “severe and pervasive” so as to alter the conditions of the
complainant’s employment to qualify as unlawful. Of course, as the courts have recognized,
not all workplace conduct that may be described as “harassment” affects a “term, condition,
or privilege” of employment within the meaning of Title VII. See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that the “mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which
engenders offensive feelings in an employee” would not affect the conditions of employment
to sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII). Thus, “working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stabil-
ity of minority group workers” would clearly qualify as actionable, but less discriminatory
events often will not. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (quot-
ing Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238).
9. Not all “large” law firms are “elite,” and the focus of this Article is primarily on the
elite, large law firms. The difference in classes of large law firms has been documented previ-
ously. See Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1886–89 (2008) (explaining three
groups of large law firms and noting that between “the two extremes of high [(Skadden)]
and low growth [(Cravath)] is a middle ground of firms with lower initial endowments of
reputational capital”). It is relatively difficult to precisely define the elite large law firms.
Thus, this Article uses the firms ranked in the Vault top fifty as a proxy for the elite firms.
Galanter and Henderson also reference and rely on the Vault rankings to demonstrate law
firm prestige. Id. at 1925–26 (discussing firms at the top of the Vault rankings as having
higher prestige and reputational capital than firms toward the bottom of the Am Law 200).
10. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); see also David Wilkins, Why Global Law Firms Should Care
About Diversity: Five Lessons from the American Experience, 2 EUR. J. L. REFORM 415, 416 (2000)
(“[T]he American mode of legal production (appropriately dubbed Cravathism in honor of
the US firm that over a century ago pioneered the practices that most US firms continue to
follow to this day) . . . .”).
11. Wilkins, supra note 10, at 417 (explaining that during the 1950s and 1960s, the so-
called “golden age” for large law firms, “virtually everyone other than white male Anglo-
Saxon Protestants” were excluded from the most prestigious law firms).
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large law firms are white males.12 Moreover, the percentages of
blacks and Hispanics at large law firms are, when compared to their
law school attendance percentages, quite low. For example, blacks
and Hispanics have consistently made up over six percent and 5.5
percent, respectively, of those enrolled in the top twenty-five law
schools since 2000. Yet today, only 3.31 percent of associates and
counsel in elite, large law firms are black, and 3.33 percent are His-
panic.13 The challenge for today’s firms is how to combat the
inequities that are “structurally embedded in the norms and cul-
tural practices of an institution”14 while also combating the present
day effects of aversive racism, implicit bias, and the stigmas associ-
ated with affirmative action.
A. The Tournament and the Great Recession
In a typical situation, an elite law firm hires promising young law
students from top law schools with impeccable grades and creden-
tials, such as a position on the law review, for a job as an associate.15
Associates are salaried employees of the firm. These students are
considered the best and brightest in their law school classes and
have a variety of tempting job opportunities.16 Students are induced
to join the firm through higher than market wages and the oppor-
tunity, for some, to eventually join the partnership, which would
enable the associate to become a co-owner in the firm and split a
share in the firm’s profits.17
The business model employed by elite law firms is traditionally
described as “the Tournament of Lawyers.”18 An essential element
of the model is employing junior and senior level associate attor-
neys who do not require substantial supervision. The most
profitable associate is the one who requires the least monitoring,
thereby freeing up the time of the supervising attorney to supervise
even more attorneys. Thus, the question is how the firm achieves a
12. The Demographics of Equity—An Update, supra note 7.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. Susan Sturm, Lawyers and the Practice of Workplace Equity, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 277, 281
(2002).
15. See Wilkins, supra note 10, at 425–26.
16. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 547–49 (noting that law
firms utilize measures of “meritocratic” hiring based on a few highly visible signals that are
easy to assess).
17. Id. at 518–20.
18. See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 10, at 424; David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiv-
ing the Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the Internal Labor
Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (1998) [hereinafter Wilkins & Gulati,
Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers].
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high level of function and efficiency from associates who receive
little oversight:
One way to induce effort without monitoring is to pay employ-
ees a higher wage than they could receive elsewhere in the
market. This wage premium has two effects that collectively
tend to lower monitoring costs. First, by offering a higher than
market-clearing wage, firms generate a large pool of qualified
applicants from which to hire. . . . Second, once a worker is
hired, she has an incentive to work hard since she knows that
if she is fired for shirking, she cannot obtain a similar salary
elsewhere and that there are many “unemployed” workers who
would gladly take her place. The net result is that firms that
employ a high-wage strategy will have an easier time finding
qualified workers and will have to spend fewer resources to
ensure that those hired are performing their jobs efficiently.19
One key to the model is to ensure that, over time, associates leave
the firm or, in the modern day tournament, abandon the quest to
become an equity partner.20 When a junior associate is hired, he is
typically one of several hires that enter the firm around the same
time.21 Large law firms need a large number of young associates
who can be engaged in less-sophisticated, yet necessary, work that is
billed to clients for a large amount of money per hour.22 As associ-
ates gain expertise, the number of associates needed at the more
senior levels dwindles because one senior associate can supervise
and direct multiple junior associates.23 One partner can supervise
and direct multiple senior associates.24 Because partners share in
the profits of the firm, they have an incentive to make as few part-
ners as possible.25 This structure allows firms to maximize the value
of associates while minimizing the number of individuals who share
19. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 518–19.
20. See, e.g., Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers, supra note 18, at
1613 (“Firms have strong incentives to minimize the low of unrecouped training expenses
through associate attrition.”). See generally Galanter & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1867 (ex-
plaining that under the “elastic tournament,” equity partnership is reserved to a very small
number of partners who control client access).
21. Modern elite, large law firms effectuate this hiring primarily through the use of sum-
mer associate programs. See infra text accompanying notes 36–40.
22. Wilkins and Gulati refer to these associates as “paperwork associates.” See Wilkins &
Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers, supra note 18, at 1609–10.
23. See Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 537–39.
24. Id.
25. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1877–78 (discussing the lower rate of
equity partners in the “elastic tournament”); Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra
note 4, at 534–35; see also Janet Ellen Raasch, Making Partner—Or Not: Is it In, Up or Over in the
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in the firms’ profits. Thus, the large law firm business model de-
pends on substantial amounts of attrition during the six to ten
years26 it takes to become an equity partner, and therein lies the
Tournament of Lawyers.27 The associates compete with each other,
and only a select few are offered partnership.
The Tournament of Lawyers thrived even in the midst of struc-
tural changes to the original promotion-to-partnership model.28 In
2000, large law firms in the major legal markets increased salaries
by as much as thirty percent, and first-year starting salaries rose to
an unprecedented 125,000 dollars.29 In comparison, a first-year as-
sociate in a firm with two to twenty-five attorneys at the time made
60,000 dollars.30 As salaries increased, the tournament expanded by
relying on high amounts of leverage.31 In the law firm model, lever-
age refers to the partner to associate ratio.32 Over the next few
years, many large law firms began striving for leverage of three asso-
ciates to every one partner, thereby leaving an even higher number
of attorneys destined to lose in the Tournament of Lawyers.33 To
effectuate this leverage, law firms employing this strategy began in-
creasing the sizes of their summer associate classes.34 From 1996 to
2006, the number of associates hired by the 250 largest law firms
increased by seventy-six percent.35 In the summer of 2007, more
than 10,000 law students worked as summer associates in one of the
195 firms surveyed as part of the American Lawyer’s (Am Law) an-
nual summer associate survey.36 That number equaled about one-
quarter of all law students set to graduate from all U.S. law schools
the following year.37 Of the top twenty firms in American Lawyer’s
21st Century?, LAW PRAC., June 2007, at 32 (discussing the changing dynamics for becoming
equity partner).
26. Wilkins, supra note 10, at 423.
27. Please note that Wilkins and Gulati do not contend that large law firms are struc-
tured in a standard rank-order economic tournament.  Instead, they find the tournament
metaphor to be a valuable tool for “constructing a model that accurately describes elite
firms.” See Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers, supra note 18, at 1587.
28. See generally Galanter & Henderson, supra note 9.
29. NALP Data Confirm It’s a Buyers’ Market for Juniors, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS FOR L.
OFFS. (IOMA), Oct. 2001.
30. Id.
31. Raasch, supra note 25, at 34.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. (noting that there was “an increasing demand for entry-level associates to fill the
bottom ranks of the pyramid”).
35. Id.
36. Paul Jaskunas, Size Does Matter, Am. Law. Online (Nov. 19, 2007), (available on
LEXIS).
37. The top twenty law schools would produce only about 6,500 graduates. Thus, even if
large law firms hired every single graduate from those schools, they would still need to hire
582 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 47:3
survey, four firms had summer programs with more than one hun-
dred students, and only nine hired thirty or fewer summer
associates.38 The 2007 summer associate class was four percent
larger than the 2006 class, and “if these visitors were factored into
firm head counts, summers would constitute 20–25% of the lawyers
at AmLaw 200 firms.”39 At the time, it was very unusual for a law
student to spend time as a summer associate and not receive an
offer for full-time employment to begin a few months after gradua-
tion.40 Law firms were expecting to need even more leverage going
forward, thereby bloating the ranks within the Tournament of Law-
yers.41 Meanwhile, large law firms raised salaries again in 2007,
ultimately resulting in first-year salaries of 160,000 dollars in the
major legal markets.42
In addition, during this time of unprecedented growth, large law
firms began operating more like businesses and less like partner-
ships, and determining the winners of the Tournament of Lawyers
started to depend less on legal acumen and more on the ability to
develop a sustainable practice. Partnership became dependent on a
person’s ability to bring in clients, and partners unable to deliver
on these expectations were demoted or fired.43 As stated by one
interviewed senior partner: “In the past, ‘good work’ and the requi-
site number of years were enough at most firms [to make partner].
Today, candidates for equity partner almost always need to be
rainmakers with a good book of business—so that they can contrib-
ute their share to the firm’s [profits per partner].”44 As suggested by
the preceding quote, during this period, large law firms also began
adopting dual partnership tracks, whereby, in addition to the tradi-
tional equity partners, some partners were considered “income
significant amounts of students from lower-ranked law schools that were not originally part of
the pool of students recruited by Cravath and its peers during the Golden Age of the 1950s
and 60s. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1870.
38. See Jaskunas, supra note 36.
39. Brian Baxter, Endless Summer, AM. LAW. (Aug. 1, 2007), http://www.americanlawyer.
com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=900005487479.
40. Shannon Henson, Full-Time Offers for Summer Assocs. Plunged in ’08, LAW360 (Feb. 25,
2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/88948/full-time-offers-for-summer-assocs-
plunged-in-08 (noting that in 2008 the number of offers extended, a rate of ninety percent,
at the conclusion of summer associate programs was at the lowest level since 2003).
41. See Raasch, supra note 25, at 35 (noting that some consultants predicted eventual
leverage rates of ten associates to every one partner).
42. See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, Who Will Pay for Associate Raises: Partners or Clients?,
A.B.A. J. REPORT, Feb. 2, 2007, available at http://law.gsu.edu/dyarn/spring07/law6020/
Who%20Will%20Pay%20for%20Associate%20Raises%20Partners%20or%20Clients.htm.
43. Raasch, supra note 25, at 33 (noting that in March 2007, Chicago-based Mayer
Brown announced that it would eliminate more than ten percent of the firm’s 427 equity
partners; half were demoted and half fired).
44. Id. at 34.
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partners.” They were partners in name only but continued to re-
ceive very large salaries. By 2007, eighty percent of the firms in the
Am Law 200 utilized a two-tier model.45 Becoming an equity partner
became dependent upon one’s ability to bring in a sustainable
book of business, which began taking even more time than before
and certainly became even more competitive.46 This reflected the
reality that the original Tournament of Lawyers had undergone a
number of structural changes that resulted in an even more com-
petitive and elastic tournament to become an equity partner, which
involved expanding the ranks of nonequity partnership as well as
the number of attorneys off the partnership track.47
In 2007, many highly profitable firms had leverage of four or five
associates to each partner.48 Some consultants even predicted that
the eventual leverage ratio would be ten to one at the largest
firms.49 Then, in 2008, the housing bubble burst, and the legal pro-
fession, along with the rest of the U.S. economy, was plunged into
the Great Recession.50 With the bursting of the housing bubble
came the bursting of the bloated tournament model, and excessive
leverage became a detriment instead of an asset. Law firms began
reversing course and began a systematic decrease of leverage ratios.
As a result, people began to wonder whether the Great Recession
would have “permanent adverse effects on the legal profession”51
and whether the tournament model would remain sustainable over
the long term. As legal work decreased in demand, highly leveraged
law firms were left with large numbers of associates without work to
do, and for the first time large law firms began deep, systematic lay-
offs within their associate ranks. From Fall 2008 to early 2009, each
45. Id. at 36.
46. See id. at 34. It should be noted that obtaining a sustainable book of business appears
to be more difficult for persons of color, as survey evidence suggests that attorneys of color
are more likely to have clients who are also persons of color instead of clients who are white.
See also Richard O. Lempert et al., Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs
Through Law School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395, 401 (2000) (“All Michigan alumni are dispro-
portionately likely to serve same-race clients . . . .”).
47. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1867 (explaining the modern day Tour-
nament of Lawyers as an “elastic tournament” due to the “widening ranks of nonequity
partnership and permanent ‘off track’ attorneys suggest[ing] . . . a more complex and elon-
gated tournament structure . . . [for] both partners and associates”).
48. Raasch, supra note 25, at 35.
49. Id.
50. See generally Eli Wald, The Great Recession and the Legal Profession, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2051, 2051 (2010) (“Perhaps with historical hindsight, 2008–2009 will be remembered not
for the Great Recession that first rocked the U.S. residential mortgage credit market, then
froze American and global financial markets and eventually led to a worldwide recession, but
as an inflection point for world history, the U.S. economy, and the legal profession.”) (foot-
note omitted).
51. Id. at 2052.
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week brought news of another round of lay-offs. In 2008, an esti-
mated 1,922 attorneys lost their law firm positions; in 2009, an
estimated 12,259 people were laid off.52 During this time, many of
the summer associates who had been given Fall 2009 and 2010 start-
ing dates instead received long-term deferrals,53 and in some
instances rescissions,54 because large law firms could not afford, at
their high pay rates, to take on the former summer associates to
whom they had given full-time job offers.
In 2010, however, these numbers slowed, and only an estimated
745 attorneys were laid off from large law firms.55 Furthermore, in
2011, of the 126 firms that responded to American Lawyer’s Sum-
mer Hiring Survey, 111 provided summer associate class figures that
demonstrated an average summer associate class of 33.3 associates,
up by twenty-five percent over the 2010 average of 26.7 associates.56
For example, in 2009, Cravath had 123 summer associates; in 2010,
twenty-three summer associates; and in 2011, fifty-two summer asso-
ciates.57 The largest reported summer associate class in 2011 was
that of Latham & Watkins with 168 summer associates, which is
striking given the large number of associates laid off by the firm in
the preceding years.58 In 2012, Am Law found that responding
firms hired 15.5 percent more summer associates in 2012 than they
had in 2011.59 Moreover, nearly all of the summer associates work-
ing at large law firms in 2011 and 2012 received full-time job offers,
up from an offer rate of 69.3 percent for the 2009 summer associate
class.60 This may be unsurprising given the fact that 2012 was “a very
52. Ashby Jones, 2010: The Year in BigLaw Layoffs, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan. 24, 2011,
5:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/01/24/2010-the-year-in-biglaw-layoffs/.
53. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Making Sense of the Law-Firm Deferral Situation, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (Oct. 6, 2009, 9:07 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/10/06/making-sense-of-the-
law-firm-deferral-situation/; Ashby Jones, Only a Few Bucking the Deferral Trend, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (June 18, 2009, 9:29 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/06/18/deferrals-us-surely-
you-jest/; Ashby Jones, The Mighty Are Humbled: Cravath Also Offers Associate Deferrals, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (June 12, 2009, 12:12 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/06/12/the-mighty-
are-humbled-cravath-offers-associate-deferrals/.
54. See, e.g., Elie Mystal, Rescission Open Thread: Which Firms Are Pulling Offers?, ABOVE THE
LAW (May 4, 2010, 6:19 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/05/rescission-open-thread-
which-firms-are-pulling-offers/.
55. Jones, supra note 52.
56. Tom Huddleston, Jr., Am Law Data: Summer Associate Class Sizes Up in 2011, LAW.COM
(Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202510631301.
57. Id.
58. Elie Mystal, How Did Latham Become the Poster Child for Layoffs?, ABOVE THE LAW (June
14, 2010, 2:17 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/06/how-did-latham-become-the-poster-
child-for-layoffs/ (noting that Latham & Watkins was the first firm to lay people off and laid
off a total of 440 people, 190 associates, and 250 staff).
59. Sara Randazzo, Job Offers Abound for Summer Associates as Hiring Increases, NAT’L L.J.
(Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1348416443924.
60. Id.
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good year . . . for [large] law firm revenues,” which included a five
percent increase in gross law firm revenues as compared to 2011, a
net income increase of six percent, and a profits per equity partner
increase of nearly five percent.61 These increases in summer associ-
ate positions indicate that the tournament model, while changed
and less reliant on extremely high rates of leverage, remains at elite,
large law firms.62 A firm like Latham & Watkins that brings in a
nationwide class of more than one hundred summer associates63
but that makes, for example, only eighteen partners a year,64 who
are not necessarily equity partners, has returned to relying on the
tournament as a large component of its business model. While
there are currently significant mixed messages regarding the health
of large law firms generally, with reports on the same day indicating
that large law firms are in the “hiring mood again”65 contrasting
with the news that there are more lay-offs of associates and partner
demotions,66 there does appear to be an elite set of large law firms
that are committed to continuing their use of the basic tournament
model.
Furthermore, for many, the partnership carrot and financial in-
centives are still strong enough that many associates ignore the
costs of participating in the even more competitive tournament, at
61. Jennifer Smith, 2012: It Was a Very Good Year (For Law Firm Revenues), WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG (Jan. 28, 2013, 6:38 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/01/28/2012-it-was-a-very-
good-year-for-law-firm-revenues/?mod=WSJBlog.
62. See CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION & THOMPSON REUTERS PEER MONI-
TOR, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., 2013 REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE LEGAL MARKET 14
(2013), available at https://www.law.georgetown.edu/continuing-legal-education/executive-
education/upload/2013-report.pdf (“[T]here is evidence that many law firm leaders under-
stand the realities of the changed market and the imperative for their firms to act decisively
to address them. . . . And a substantial majority now sees trends like increased pricing compe-
tition, more commoditization of legal work, more non-hourly billing, fewer equity partners,
more contract lawyers, reduced leverage, and smaller first year classes as permanent trends
going forward.”).
63. See Huddleston, supra note 56.
64. In 2012, Latham & Watkins announced promotion of eighteen associates to partner
and twenty-one associates to counsel, a non-partnership, salaried position. See Latham & Wat-
kins Names 18 New Partners, 21 New Counsel, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP (Nov. 14, 2012), http://
www.lw.com/news/new-partners-counsel-for-2013-Nov2012.
65. Karen Sloan, Large Firms in A Hiring Mood Again, NAT’L L.J. (June 24, 2013), http://
www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202607980312 (“The country’s largest law firms
are wading deeper into the new associate hiring pool—a welcome development after years of
recruiting declines.”).
66. Matthew Huisman, 17 Partners Plan to Leave Patton Boggs, BLOG LEGAL TIMES (June 24,
2013, 1:25 PM), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/06/17-partners-plan-to-leave-pat-
ton-boggs.html (“Patton Boggs warned 18 partners earlier this year that their performance
was unsatisfactory, and that they needed to improve or find a new firm. Now 17 of them are
parting ways with Patton Boggs.”); Joe Palazzolo, Weil Lays Off 60 Associates, 110 Staff, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (June 24, 2013, 10:26 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/06/24/weil-lays-off-
60-associates-110-staff/.
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least for a time.67 These costs include working a very high number
of hours per week, a loss of personal autonomy, as well as deep
personal and familial sacrifice for the clients of the firm.68 Arguably
most important, these costs often lead to unhappiness and discon-
tent for the associate, as well as those close to the associate.69 Over
time, the uncertainty of winning the tournament in conjunction
with the difficult working conditions leads the majority of associates
at large law firms to leave.70 Thus, low rates of retention amongst
attorneys joining large law firms are accepted as necessary compo-
nents of the law firm business model.71
The necessity of attrition for the large law firm business model,
however, does not in and of itself explain the different rates of re-
tention between attorneys of color and whites.72
67. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 519–20 (“Firms also seek to
induce effort by promising employees a reward (commonly either a cash bonus or a lucrative
promotion) if they can credibly signal that they have successfully performed their jobs over a
specified period of time. In such firms, workers compete against each other in a ‘tourna-
ment’ that rewards those who have made the greatest contributions to the firm. Shirking,
therefore, is costly to the employee because it reduces her chance of receiving the reward. . . .
Firms thus have an incentive to create a pyramid structure in which a relatively small number
of employees are responsible for monitoring the performance of a larger number of junior
workers, who are themselves motivated to work hard by the prospect of becoming senior
employees who are then eligible for the reward.”).
68. See generally Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 890 (1999); Dan Slater,
Another View: In Praise of Law Firm Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 1, 2009, 3:41 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/07/01/another-view-in-praise-of-law-firm-layoffs/ (“For
many lawyers at law firms, particularly those who spent the early part of their careers toiling
in structured finance departments and contributing, in the end, nothing to nothing, this
recession may be the thing that delivers them from more 3,000-hour years of such drudgery
as changing the dates on securitization documents and shuffling them from one side of the
desk to the other. Like a relationship gone bad, clearly hopeless to everyone but the impris-
oned, it often takes a forced exit to break the leash of inertia that collars so many smart law
graduates to mind-numbing work.”).
69. See generally Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems
and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171 (2005) (explaining that the results of a survey
indicated that high billing requirements led to large amounts of unhappiness and attrition
within large law firms); Schiltz, supra note 68, at 895.
70. See generally Fortney, supra note 69.
71. Wilkins, supra note 10, at 428 (“It should be abundantly clear by now . . . that reten-
tion is not just a problem for minorities and women. Large firms increasingly are having
difficulty retaining all of their associates.”).
72. For example, the estimated annual attrition rates at large law firms amongst new and
midlevel associates are ten percent for whites and thirty percent for blacks. See The Black
Experience at Major Law Firms, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/image
pages/2006/11/28/us/29diverse_graphic.html.
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B. After Twenty Years of Tracking, Little Progress
The available data demonstrates that large numbers of persons of
color are attending the top twenty-five law schools, a much smaller
percentage join large law firms, and an even smaller percentage are
made partner. This is despite the fact that the American Bar Associ-
ation (ABA) and the National Association for Law Placement
(NALP) began questioning and tracking demographic diversity
within law firms in 1993.73 Twenty years later, only small gains have
been made in efforts to increase large law firm demographic diver-
sity. These small gains cannot be explained away by different
employment preferences between white attorneys and black and
Hispanic attorneys.
1. Demographics of Law Schools and Law Firms
Every year, thousands of persons of color enroll in law schools.74
From 2000 to 2013, the percentage of persons of color matricu-
lating into the top twenty-five law schools was consistently over
23.53 percent of the student body and has recently topped 28 per-
cent.75 Enrolling in law school, however, does not guarantee a job at
a law firm post-graduation, particularly at one of the top law firms.
As evidenced in Figures 1 and 2,76 the percentage of attorneys of
73. See Eunice Chwenyen Peters, Note, Making It to the Brochure But Not to Partnership, 45
WASHBURN L.J. 625, 626 (2006).
74. See LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, MATRICULANTS BY ETHNIC & GENDER GROUP, http:/
/www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/ethnic-gender-matriculants (last visited Nov. 28, 2013)
[hereinafter LSAC, CURRENT SUMMARY]; LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, MATRICULANTS BY
ETHNIC & GENDER GROUP (ARCHIVE), http://www.lsac.org/lsacresources/data/ethnic-gen-
der-matriculants/archive (last visited Nov. 28, 2013) [hereinafter LSAC, ARCHIVE SUMMARY].
75. See infra Figure 1. Enrollment figures are utilized in this section because graduation
rates by demographic group are not reported by law schools to LSAC or the ABA, making it
difficult to ascertain this data. See, e.g., GITA Z. WILDER, LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL, THE
ROAD TO LAW SCHOOL AND BEYOND: EXAMINING CHALLENGES TO RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY
IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 20 (2003) (“National data about persistence in law school are diffi-
cult to come by and often must be inferred by juxtaposing information from different
sources.”).
76. See infra Figures 1 and 2. Please note that the data in Figure 2 reflects persons of
color at all law firms, not just those at large law firms, which is this Article’s focus. The data in
Figure 2, however, is still helpful because it demonstrates the increase in the percentages of
attorneys of color at law firms over time. The data on law firms is aggregated when reported.
Figure 3 reports the author’s manual tally of the percentages of partners, associates, and
counsel of color at the top fifty law firms for the years 2011, 2012, and 2013, as ranked by
Vault and reported to NALP. See infra Figure 3. A comparison of the numbers at law firms
generally versus those at the top fifty firms in 2011, 2012, and 2013 indicates that the differ-
ences between the two groups are small enough that these longitudinal numbers of all law
firms continue to be helpful indicators of what is going on within large law firms.
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color employed at law firms from 2000 to 2013 was substantially less
than the percentages enrolled in law school; in 2013, persons of
color made up 20.93 percent of associates and 7.1 percent of part-
ners at law firms. At the top fifty large law firms in 2011, 22.39
percent of associates and counsel were attorneys of color, and 8.23
percent of partners were partners of color.77 At the top fifty large
law firms in 2012, 20.86 percent were associates and counsel of
color and 8.37 percent were partners of color.78 At the top fifty
large law firms in 2013, 21.25 percent were associates and counsel
of color and 9.33 percent were partners of color.79
77. See infra Figure 3 (analysis on file with author).
78. See infra Figure 3. Please note that the Vault top fifty law firms in 2011, 2012, and
2013 differed, although the vast majority of firms overlapped.
79. See infra Figure 3.
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Figure 1: 2000–2013: Percentage of Enrollees to Law School by Race & Ethnicity at
(2012) Top 25 Law Schools80
Black/ Am. Native 2 or %
African Indian/ Asian All HI/Pacific More Enrollees
Am. AK Nat’l Am. Hispanic Islander Races of Color
200081 NC82 NC NC NC NC NC 24.47%
2001 6.97% .75% 10.05% 5.76% NC NC 23.53%
2002 6.94% .71% 10.25% 5.94% NC NC 23.84%
2003 7% .73% 10.3% 6.08% NC NC 24.11%
2004 7.06% .71% 10.75% 6.15% NC NC 24.67%
2005 7.29% .78% 10.45% 6.34% NC NC 24.86%
2006 7.38% .76% 11.42% 6.54% NC NC 26.1%
2007 7.22% .76% 11.40% 6.65% NC NC 26.04%
2008 6.97% .86% 11.53% 6.65% NC NC 26.02%
2009 6.76% .9% 11.04% 6.57% NC NC 25.27%
2010 6.83% .9% 11.22% 6.75% NC NC 25.7%
2011 6.94% .95% 11.4% 7.14% NC NC 26.43%
2012 6.66% .78% 10.88% 7.45% .44% 1.84% 28.06%
2013 6.36% .65% 10.92% 7.38% .07% 2.68% 28.08%
80. Figure 1 aggregates the reported enrollees of color from 2000–2013 at the top
twenty-five law schools as ranked by US News in 2012: Yale, Stanford, Harvard, Columbia,
University of Chicago, NYU, University of Pennsylvania, University of Virginia, U.C. Berkeley
(Boalt), Michigan, Duke, Northwestern, Georgetown, Cornell, UCLA, University of Texas,
Vanderbilt, University of Southern California, Minnesota, George Washington University,
University of Washington, Notre Dame, Washington University, Emory, and Washington &
Lee. See LAW SCH. ADMISSION COUNCIL & AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA-LSAC OFFICIAL GUIDE TO ABA-
APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS (2000 to 2013 eds.). From 2000–2011, the publication tracked the
following racial categories: African American, American Indian, Asian American, Mexican
American, Puerto Rican, and Hispanic. From 2012–2013, LSAC changed the categorizations
and tracked: all Hispanics; American Indian/Alaskan Native; Asian; Black/African American;
National Hawaiian/Pacific islander; and two or more races. For purposes of comparison, this
chart aggregates the data for Mexican American, Puerto Rican, and Hispanic into the “All
Hispanic” category. These schools are used as a representative sample of the “top” law
schools, although there is variation from year to year in the law school rankings, and
historically other law schools are included in the top twenty-five, and some of the schools
included in this analysis were not ranked in the top twenty-five in prior years. The percentage
of persons of color at the top twenty-five law schools is slightly less than that for all reporting
law schools. See LSAC, CURRENT SUMMARY, supra note 74; LSAC, ARCHIVE SUMMARY, supra note
74.
81. In 2000, the LSAC data reported persons of color data in the aggregate only. See AM.
BAR ASS’N, OFFICIAL AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDE TO APPROVED LAW SCHOOLS (Rick L.
Morgan & Kurt Snyder eds., 2000 ed. 1999).
82. “NC” refers to information that was not collected.
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Figure 2: Percentage Persons of Color Lawyers at Law Firms















83. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Presence of Women and Attorneys of
Color in Large Law Firms Continues to Rise Slowly (Nov. 15, 2000), available at http://www.
nalp.org/2000presenceofwomenattorneysofcolor.
84. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Dearth of Women and Attorneys of
Color Remains in Law Firms (Dec. 3, 2001), available at http://www.nalp.org/2001dearthof
womenattorneysofcolor.
85. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Presence of Women and Attorneys of
Color in Large Law Firms Continues to Rise Slowly but Steadily (Oct. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.nalp.org/2002presenceofwomenandattorneysofcolor.
86. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Women and Attorneys of Color
Continue to Make Small Gains at Large Law Firms, (Nov. 7, 2003), available at http://www.
nalp.org/2003womenandattorneysofcolor.
87. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Women and Attorneys of Color
Continue to Make Only Small Gains at Large Law Firms, (Nov. 5, 2004), available at http://
www.nalp.org/2004womenandattorneysofcolor.
88. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Women and Attorneys of Color
Continue to Make Small Gains at Large Law Firms, (Nov. 17, 2005), available at http://www.
nalp.org/2005womenandattorneysofcolor.
89. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Partnership at Law Firms Elusive for
Minority Women (Nov. 8, 2006), available at http://www.nalp.org/2006partnershipelusivefor
minoritywomen.
90. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Minority Women Still
Underrepresented in Law Firm Partnership Ranks—Change in Diversity of Law Firm
Leadership Very Slow Overall, (Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.nalp.org/minority
womenstillunderrepresented.
91. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Law Firm Diversity Demographics Slow
to Change—Minority Women Remain Particularly Scarce in Law Firm Partnership Ranks,
(Oct. 10, 2008), available at http://www.nalp.org/lawfirmdiversity.
92. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Law Firm Diversity Demographics
Show Little Change, Despite Economic Downturn, (Oct. 21, 2009), available at http://www.
nalp.org/oct09lawfirmdiversity.
93. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Law Firm Diversity Among Associates
Erodes in 2010, (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.nalp.org/2010lawfirmdiversity
[hereinafter NALP, Law Firm Diversity].
94. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Law Firm Diversity Wobbles: Minority
Numbers Bounce Back While Women Associates Extend Two-Year Decline (Nov. 3, 2011),
available at http://www.nalp.org/2011_law_firm_diversity.
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Figure 3: Percentage of Persons of Color at Vault Top 50 Law Firms97
Black/ Am. Native 2 or %
African Indian/ Asian HI/Pac. More Attorneys
Am. AK Nat’l Am. Hispanic Isl. Races of Color
Partners of Color
2011 1.84% .06% 3.99% 2.02% .03% .29% 8.23%
2012 1.52% .09% 4.39% 1.9% .18% .29% 8.37%
2013 1.59% .08% 4.93% 2.3% .00% .42% 9.33%
Associates & Counsel of Color
2011 3.96% .13% 12.42% 3.8% .04% 2.04% 22.39%
2012 3.31% .11% 12.02% 3.33% .12% 1.96% 20.86%
2013 3.44% .12% 11.97% 3.42% .03% 2.27% 21.25%
One might compare consistent enrollment of more than the
23.53 percent students of color since 2000 with the 20.93 percent
associates of color98 at all law firms, as reported by NALP in 2013,
and 21.25 percent of associates and counsel of color99 at the top
large law firms in 2013 and believe that the legal profession is mak-
ing progress towards achieving greater demographic diversity
within law firms. This sense of achievement exists because, over
time, one can observe small incremental increases in the number of
associates and partners of color employed by all law firms as re-
ported by NALP.100 These numbers, however, fail to reflect three
important realities.
95. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Representation of Women Among
Associates Continues to Fall, Even as Minority Associates Make Gains (Dec. 13, 2012),
available at http://www.nalp.org/2012lawfirmdiversity.
96. Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, Representation of Women Associates
Falls for Fourth Straight Year as Minority Associates Continue to Make Gains—Women and
Minority Partners Continue to Make Small Gains (Dec. 11, 2013), available at http://www.
nalp.org/uploads/PressReleases/2013WomenMinoritiesPressRelease.pdf [hereinafter
NALP, Representation of Women Associates].
97. Vault ranks the top one hundred law firms. See Law Firm Rankings 2012: Vault Law
100, VAULT, http://web.archive.org/web/20110727113459/http://www.vault.com/wps/
portal/usa/rankings/individual?rankingId1=2&rankingId2=-1&rankings=1&regionId=0&
rankingYear=2012 (accessed using the Internet Archive: WayBackMachine; select the desired
year using the drop down) (last visited Dec. 1, 2013). These percentages come from the
statistics reported to NALP by the firms ranked in the Vault top fifty. For firms that provided
collective data for all offices, these numbers were used. For firms that provided information
by office, the numbers included were aggregated from the firm’s offices in the four major
legal markets—New York, Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Los Angeles—although not all
firms had offices in each of these cities. Attorneys reported in the “staff attorney” or “other
attorney” columns on NALP were not included in this analysis because these attorneys are
typically never tracked as eligible for the equity partner tournament. See NALP DIRECTORY OF
LEGAL EMPLOYERS, http://www.nalpdirectory.com (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
98. Supra Figure 2.
99. Supra Figure 3.
100. See supra Figure 2.
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First, in 2010 the number of associates of color decreased for the
first time since NALP began tracking this information in the
1990s.101 The decline was slight and a result of the Great Recession
but left the total percentage of associates and partners of color at
law firms at just 12.40 percent in 2010. This percentage was signifi-
cantly lower than the percentage of students of color enrolling in
law schools over the prior ten years. The past few years have seen
gains for attorneys of color within law firms, with the total percent-
age reaching 13.36 percent in 2013, compared with 12.91 percent
in 2012, 12.70 percent in 2011, and 12.40 percent in 2010.102 The
decline in 2010 not only slowed the progress firms were making,
but it also signaled to many that firms were willing to sacrifice dem-
ographic diversity.103
Second, the above statistics demonstrate that the percentage of
persons of color from traditionally underrepresented groups—
blacks and Hispanics—currently employed by prestigious law firms
is significantly less than the percentage enrolled in law schools over
the preceding ten year period. This is despite the fact that over the
past several years, law firms have employed many different initia-
tives targeting demographically diverse individuals in an attempt to
improve diversity within law firms. For example, from 2000 to 2013,
an average of 10.89 percent of those enrolled in the top twenty-five
law schools were of Asian descent, but from 2011 to 2013, an aver-
age of over twelve percent of associates and counsel in the top fifty
law firms were of Asian descent.104 In contrast, an average of 6.95
percent of those enrolling in law schools over the same period iden-
tify as black, but as of 2013 only 3.44 percent of associates and
counsel at the same fifty law firms are black.105 A similar discrepancy
is apparent with Hispanics.106 Thus, there appear to be additional
barriers of entry to obtaining and retaining employment at the top
law firms for blacks and Hispanics than for other demographic
groups.107
101. Press Release, NALP, Law Firm Diversity, supra note 93.
102. Press Release, NALP, Representation of Women Associates, supra note 96.
103. While not the focus of this Article, the decline in the rates of women within law firms
has not bounced back. This is especially troubling for women of color, who have consistently
struggled the most in succeeding at large law firms. Fifty-seven percent of offices reporting to
NALP reported no minority women partners and over twenty-seven percent reported no mi-
nority women associates. Id.
104. Please note that the LSAC and NALP charts differ because the two organizations
gathered racial identification data differently.
105. See supra Figures 1 and 3.
106. See supra Figures 1 and 3.
107. There are also barriers to entry to law schools for these groups, and the problems
associated with garnering a sufficient “pipeline” of black and Hispanic students is well docu-
mented. See A Disturbing Trend in Law School Diversity, COLUMBIA U. SCH. OF L., http://blogs.
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Third, the reported percentage of partners of color reflects both
income and equity partners, meaning the number of equity part-
ners in elite, large law firms is well below 1.59 percent for blacks
and 2.3 percent for Hispanics,108 figures that represent both types
of partners.109 When NALP attempted to begin gathering data on
the different partner types in a systematic way, large law firms
threatened to stop providing any information to NALP.110
2. Black and Hispanic Attorneys’ Employment Preferences
It seems fair to conclude that the low percentages of black and
Hispanic associates at large law firms are, in part, a reflection of the
“first generation bias” that initially excluded them from being hired
at elite, large law firms. As Susan Sturm has explained, “[f]irst gen-
eration bias involves deliberate exclusion or subordination directed
at identifiable members of disfavored groups.”111 This initial exclu-
sion may, in part, have been motivated by what social psychologists
refer to as “dominative racism,” meaning the old-fashioned, blatant
form of racism.112 Nevertheless, large law firms stopped deliberate
exclusion and subordination of attorneys of color decades ago, and
overt expressions of racism have largely ceased within the
workplace.
Another reason there are smaller percentages of blacks and His-
panics within large law firms is that there are lower rates of black
and Hispanics attending college, which then leads to even lower
rates of black and Hispanics attending law school. The result is that
lower rates of blacks and Hispanics attend law school as compared
to their relative population within the United States.113 It is also pos-
sible that blacks and Hispanics are hired by elite, large law firms at
law.columbia.edu/salt/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2013) (noting that law school enrollment has
grown by over 3,000 students in the first-year class when compared with fifteen years ago,
while over the same period African American and Mexican American enrollments have de-
creased not just as a percentage of the class but in the raw numbers). The barriers to entry to
law school still cannot account for the failure of these groups to obtain and retain employ-
ment at large law firms.
108. See supra Figure 3.
109. See supra Figure 3.
110. See Vivia Chen, What Women Want: Partnership Details, AM. L. DAILY (Feb. 24, 2010,
9:06 AM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2010/02/what-women-want.html.
111. Sturm, supra note 14, at 280.
112. John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, New Directions in Aversive Racism Research:
Persistence and Pervasiveness, in 53 NEB. SYMP. ON MOTIVATION, MOTIVATIONAL ASPECTS OF
PREJUDICE AND RACISM, supra note 2, at 43, 44.
113. See Christine Gregory, Building Social Justice Leaders: The University of Michigan Law
School’s Diversity Program, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 302, 303 (2013) (citing Tamar Lewin, Law School
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much lower rates than suggested by their percentages within the
student bodies of elite law schools.114 Still, the education pipeline
and hiring issues are separate and distinct from that of why the at-
torneys of color who are hired by large law firms depart at such
higher rates than their white counterparts. That specific issue—re-
tention—is the focus of this Article.115
If blacks and Hispanics simply prefer to work elsewhere, then a
retention problem resulting from discrimination or bias would not
appear to exist.116 The empirical data on the preferences of attor-
neys of color versus those of whites gathered in the award-winning
study surveying University of Michigan Law graduates from 1970 to
1996, albeit dated, provides some guidance.117 The study looked ex-
plicitly at “career moves across sectors” and found that
“[m]inorities and whites are very much alike. Both have tended to
leave jobs in private practice or the legal-services/public-interest
sector and to move into jobs in the business/finance area and, for
graduates of the last two cohorts, government.”118
Specifically, the study demonstrated that to the extent that there
are differences in preferences between persons of color and whites
with regards to pursuing careers in public service, government, or
law firm practice, we see these preferences exhibited in students’
choices for jobs immediately after graduation.119 Attorneys of color
are more likely than whites to begin careers in government, public
Admissions Lag Among Minorities, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A22, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/01/07/education/07law.html?_r=0).
114. Determining this would require data from law firms regarding the number of associ-
ates by class. In other words, the firms would need to report the demographic make-up of
associates by year or at least year grouping. This data is not currently collected or published
by NALP, although it may be a worthy endeavor to assist in efforts of those researching demo-
graphic trends in the life cycle of the elite, large law firm.
115. It should be noted that by focusing on retention, the Article is also naturally focused
on promotion to partnership. For ease of reference, I will refer to this aspect as retention
throughout, but the term should be construed broadly.
116. In groups that have previously experienced explicit barriers of entry to prestigious
and high-paying jobs, one should be skeptical of claims that a particular group is under-
represented because of a lack of interest. See generally Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women
and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990).
117. The study looked at black, Hispanic, and American Indian graduates. Lempert et al.,
supra note 46, at 402 (evaluating responses to a seven-page questionnaire mailed in late 1997
and early 1998 to 2,144 members of the Michigan Law School classes of 1970–1976). These
findings regarding black and Hispanic preferences are consistent with more recent empirical
studies conducted by Richard Sander. See Richard H. Sander, The Racial Paradox of the Corpo-
rate Law Firm, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1755, 1768–71 (2006). A more robust qualitative study of black
and Hispanic attorney preferences would be a valuable contribution to more fully under-
standing these issues.
118. Lempert et al., supra note 46, at 441.
119. Id. at 401.
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service, or public interest positions.120 This initial decision by many
persons of color to enter non-law firm practice immediately after
law school diminishes, at least to a certain extent, the concern that
attorneys of color are leaving firms in large numbers to pursue work
in the public sector, because they are already working in the public
interest. Moreover, many attorneys of color participate in public
service activities, such as politics or as nonprofit board members, in
their spare time and do so at much higher rates than whites.121 This
would also tend to diminish the concern that attorneys of color
leave law practice for public sector employment at higher rates than
whites because attorneys of color have traditionally fulfilled their
preference to engage in public sector activities in addition to their
primary employment opportunities. Finally, the study demonstrates
that the “propensity of minority alumni to be currently in business
careers does not differ substantially from that of white alumni.”122
Thus, concerns that attorneys of color are leaving law firms at
higher rates than whites, due to increased opportunities to work as
corporate counsel, should also be diminished. That is not to say
that differences in preferences could not explain some part of the
differential between the rates of retention of attorneys of color and
whites. A larger percentage of persons of color than whites leave
private practice to become judges, public officials, or government
agency managers.123 It is unclear whether this impacts associates or
partners of color more heavily. Nevertheless, looking at the com-
plete data from the Michigan study certainly does not explain the
retention rate disparities.
A small, qualitative study recently undertaken by Twin Cities Di-
versity in Practice bolsters the findings of the Michigan study.124 It
examined the core reasons why associates of color were leaving law
firms and what strategies might be helpful for law firms to imple-
ment in order to retain more attorneys of color.125 A survey was sent
to the eighty-one associate attorneys that left their organizations
120. See id. But see Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Legal Education and Entry into
the Legal Profession: The Role of Race, Gender, and Educational Debt, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 832–34
(1995) (finding that after adjusting for grades, loans, law school activities, and state prefer-
ences, blacks were more likely to take jobs at corporate law firms than their white
counterparts).
121. See, e.g., Lempert et al., supra note 46, at 441.
122. Id. at 429.
123. See generally id. at 428.
124. See Sunil Ramlall et al., Retaining Lawyers of Color: Understanding the Core Reasons for
Turnover and Strategies for Improving Retention (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author);
Val Jensen, Twin Cities Diversity in Practice, The Best & The Brightest: Understanding Minority
Associate Attrition & Strategies for Improving Retention (May 11, 2013) (unpublished presenta-
tion) (on file with author).
125. Jensen, supra note 124, at 5.
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from 2005 to 2012, and they received nineteen completed surveys
and/or one-on-one interviews, resulting in a 23.5 percent response
rate.126 Because of the small legal market, even with the response
rate of 23.5 percent, they were able to ascertain where all eighty-one
attorneys transitioned after leaving their positions at law firms.
Thirty-four associates went on to other law firms (fourteen large,
eleven small/mid-size firms, and nine solo practitioners), twenty-
nine left for corporate legal departments, twelve left for the public
sector, and six left for non-legal careers.127
The associates responding to the survey or participating in the
one-on-one interview expressed a strong concern that they were not
provided an opportunity to work on important matters at their pre-
vious firms. The study concluded that there “seemed to be a barrier
as far as associates of color” in attempting to get the more lucrative
projects.128 This “lack of meaningful work” contributed dramatically
to the decisions of associates to leave the firm.129 In addition, associ-
ates of color indicated that the internal politics of the firm, as well
as a “lack of relationships,” had led them to leave the organiza-
tion.130 Thus, while it is reasonable to believe that not all eighty-one
of the associates would have stayed at the firm long-term, it is en-
tirely possible that the thirty-four associates who left their firms for
other law firms would have remained had the conditions within their
initial law firm been more positive. It is that segment of attorneys of
color that this Article is aimed at helping firms retain.
II. THE RETENTION PROBLEM
The modern day problems facing elite, large law firms of at-
tempting to rectify the retention disparities between whites and
black and Hispanic attorneys were not predetermined. First and
foremost, they are a result of the failure of client-corporations to
sufficiently demand demographic diversity when hiring outside
counsel at elite, large firms. To be clear, the most effective means to
improve greater demographic diversity within large firms is suffi-
cient, collective pressure from clients because harm to a law firm
and individual partners’ bottom line is the surest way to encourage
significant change. Without this pressure from clients, equity part-
ners within large law firms have lacked the proper incentives to
126. Id. at 8.
127. Id. at 12.
128. Ramlall, supra note 124, at 8.
129. Jensen, supra note 124, at 11.
130. Id.
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implement new policies and procedures that would combat struc-
tural bias, aversive racism, implicit bias, and affirmative action
related stigma. This Part explains how client-corporations failed to
effectively use market pressure to decrease the retention rate dis-
parities at elite, large law firms. It next outlines three main causes
for the retention rate differentials. The Part concludes by discuss-
ing the importance of instilling voice and loyalty in black and
Hispanic attorneys.
A. Market Failure
Over the past fifty years, clients stopped becoming loyal to a par-
ticular firm and started to become loyal to particular partners.131
Whether a partner at a firm is promoted or is perceived as having
power depends, in part, on whether the person can “leave the firm
with clients in tow.”132 As a result, when a client specifies how he
wishes to receive legal services, the partner connecting that client to
the firm often feels significant pressure to see those changes made
to ensure that the client does not defect to a different partner—
whether in the person’s own firm or at another firm.133 This phe-
nomenon has resulted in a significant increase in power held by
client-corporations, thereby giving them the ability to incentivize
owners of large law firms to alter decision-making.
Increasing the demographic diversity of large law firms is one
such situation where client-corporations have attempted to influ-
ence firms’ decision-making.134 Indeed, the current low percentage
of attorneys of color at large law firms might be considered surpris-
ing given that law firm clients have purportedly demanded greater
demographic diversity from law firms for over fifteen years.135 Cli-
ent-corporations’ urging law firms to increase their demographic
diversity did result in some tangible improvements. The reality,
however, is that client-corporations have not utilized a strong
131. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1876.
132. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1892.
133. See CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION & THOMPSON REUTERS PEER MONI-
TOR, supra note 62, at 13 (“[T]here has been a shift from the seller’s market that traditionally
dominated the legal industry to a buyer’s market that will likely remain the prevailing model
for the foreseeable future. What this means is that all of the critical decisions related to the
structure and delivery of legal services—including judgment about scheduling, staffing,
scope of work, level of effort, pricing, etc.—are now being made primarily by clients and not
by their outside lawyers. This represents a fundamental shift in the relationships between
lawyers and their clients.”).
134. See supra Part II.A.2.
135. See supra Part II.A.2.
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enough set of incentives to encourage large law firms and powerful
partners to make the structural changes necessary to improve dem-
ographic diversity. Thus, the structural changes the market has
pressured law firms into implementing—changes concerned solely
with the cost and efficiency of legal services—have not had a posi-
tive effect on improving demographic diversity within large law
firms.136
1. Market Pressure from Client-Corporations
In the fall of 1998, Charles Morgan, a former BellSouth Execu-
tive Vice President and General Counsel, developed the “Diversity
in the Workplace Statement of Principle” (Statement of Princi-
ple).137 Morgan hoped that the statement would “establish an
expectation that ‘the law firms which represent [ ] companies will
actively promote diversity within their workplace.’”138 The State-
ment of Principle is purposefully short so that law firms maintain
freedom to develop their own initiatives. It states:
We expect the law firms which represent our companies to
work actively to promote diversity within their work-place. In
making our respective decisions concerning selection of
outside counsel, we will give significant weight to a firm’s com-
mitment and progress in this area.139
Approximately 500 corporations signed the Statement of Princi-
ple.140 Many corporations were likely willing to commit to its goals
because of its rather broad language and lack of detail. In response
to this proposal, large law firms began instituting new policies and
procedures. For example, in 1998, Sidley Austin LLP’s (Sidley)
136. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1914 (noting that the changes leading to the
more elastic tournament have resulted in “incentives at the individual-lawyer level that are
likely to perpetuate the marginalized status of minority and female lawyers”).
137. Charles S. Johnson, III & Lynne Faith Saunders, More than Words: Update on Diversity
in the Workplace: A Statement of Principle, GOAL IX (Am. Bar Ass’n, Comm’n on Racial & Ethnic




140. Roderick Palmore, A Call to Action: Diversity in the Legal Profession, ASS’N OF CORPO-
RATE COUNSEL (Oct. 2004), http://www.acc.com/vl/public/Article/loader.cfm?csModule=
security/getfile&pageid=16074.
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“management team comprehensively reviewed the firm’s lawyer de-
velopment and promotion system.”141 Sidley “formed separate task
forces on issues affecting women and ethnically and racially diverse
lawyers. In 2001, the task forces became permanent firm adminis-
trative committees.”142 Additionally, Cravath notes that as part of its
commitment to diversity, “in 2003 [it] intensified [its] efforts to
promote diversity and . . . established a Diversity Committee to for-
mulate and propose diversity goals for the Firm, develop and
implement practices that promote diversity, and analyze and track
the Firm’s progress in achieving those goals.”143
The Statement of Principle was successful in prompting law firms
to begin thinking more seriously about adopting programs to pro-
mote greater demographic diversity and establishing Diversity
Committees, which have become a universal component of large
law firms’ diversity plans. Nevertheless, the Statement of Principles
did not succeed in achieving sufficient improvement of the demo-
graphic diversity within law firms. In 2003, only 14.63 percent of
associates and 4.04 percent of partners in law firms were persons of
color.144
Realizing this, in 2004 Roderick Palmore issued “A Call to Ac-
tion: Diversity in the Legal Profession” (Call to Action).145 The Call
to Action notes that “all objective assessments show that the collec-
tive efforts and gains of law firms in diversity have reached a
disappointing plateau” despite the fact that hundreds of corpora-
tions signed the Statement of Principle.146 The Call to Action goes
on to state:
[W]e pledge that we will make decisions regarding which law
firms represent our companies based in significant part on the
diversity performance of the firms. We intend to look for op-
portunities for firms we regularly use which positively
distinguish themselves in this area. We further intend to end
or limit our relationships with firms whose performance con-
sistently evidences a lack of meaningful interest in being
diverse.147
141. Diversity Committee: History, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, http://www.sidley.com/diversity/
(last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
142. Id.
143. Mission Statement, CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, http://www.cravath.com/mis-
sionstatement/ (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
144. See supra Figure 2.
145. Palmore, supra note 140.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Since the Call to Action was instituted, large law firms have im-
plemented a series of initiatives aimed at increasing demographic
diversity within firms. These efforts include employing a recruit-
ment strategy aimed at increasing the numbers of demographically
diverse associates hired by the firm by sponsoring diverse law stu-
dent groups,148 recruiting at the law schools of Historically Black
Colleges and Universities (HBCU),149 and recruiting at hiring con-
ferences targeting attorneys of color.150 In addition, many firms
have established diversity scholarship programs targeted at recruit-
ing demographically diverse law students.151 Interestingly, many of
these scholarship programs continued despite the economic diffi-
culties associated with the Great Recession, and some have even
been recently expanded.152 Many firms have also adopted the use of
148. For example, firms will become sponsors of a Black Law Students Association
(BLSA).  For the 2011–2012 school year, Harvard BLSA was able to gather sponsorships at
the 12,000 dollar level. These “Platinum” sponsors received increased access to Harvard
BLSA students. See HARVARD BLACK LAW STUDENTS ASS’N, BLACK LAW STUDENTS ASSOCIATION
SPONSORSHIP LEVELS 2011–2012 (on file with author); see also Harvard Black Law Students
Ass’n, Sponsors, http://www3.law.harvard.edu/orgs/blsa/committees/fundraising/ (last vis-
ited Nov. 28, 2013).
149. For example, a review of the schools at which Kirkland & Ellis recruits includes top
thirty law schools as well as Howard University School of Law. See Kirkland & Ellis LLP—Multi-
Office Domestic Form: Recruitment & Hiring, NALP DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS, http://
www.nalpdirectory.com/employer_profile?FormID=2946&QuestionTabID=38&SearchCond
JSON={%22SearchEmployerName%22%3A%22kirkland%22} (last visited Nov. 28, 2013). A
November 28, 2013 search on the Kirkland & Ellis website indicated that six associates and
one partner are currently employed at the firm who graduated from Howard University
School of Law. Lawyers, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP, http://www.kirkland.com/sitecontent.cfm?
contentID=184 (select “Law School” drop-down menu; then select “Howard University
School of Law”) (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
150. For example, the Cook County Bar Association (CCBA), the oldest African Ameri-
can bar association in the country, holds an annual Minority Law Student Job Fair that
attracts recruiters from many top firms. See, e.g., COOK CNTY. BAR ASS’N, 2013 MINORITY LAW
STUDENT JOB FAIR: LAW STUDENT REGISTRATION INFORMATION BROCHURE (on file with author).
151. See generally Pipeline Diversity Directory, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/
groups/diversity/diversity_pipeline/resources/pipeline_diversity_directory.html (select
“Search the Pipeline Diversity Directory”; then select “Program Services” drop-down menu;
then select “Scholarship and financial assistance”) (last visited Nov. 28, 2013) (posting diver-
sity scholarships/fellowships from Arent Fox, King & Spalding, Milbank, Baker & McKenzie,
and Goodwin Proctor, among others). Please note that the efficacy of these programs has yet
to be studied, and it does appear possible that the programs motivate students to accept
positions they know to be a poor cultural fit.
152. See, e.g., Diversity, LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, http://www.lw.com/AboutUs/Diversity
(last visited Nov. 28, 2013) (“The program was launched in 2005, and for the first six years,
the firm selected four Diversity Scholars each year to receive 10,000 dollar scholarships. In
2012, the program was expanded to award six 10,000 dollar scholarships to second-year stu-
dents.”). See generally Member Diversity Initiatives, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW PLACEMENT, http://
www.nalp.org/memberdiversityinitiatives (last visited Nov. 28, 2013) (compiling information
for diversity scholarship programs, some with more than one recipient).
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affinity groups to assist in the retention of demographically diverse
associates.153
These diversity efforts implemented by large law firms, which
largely focused on recruitment, demonstrate a commitment to find
solutions to improve demographic diversity. Still, there remain sig-
nificant disparities in the rates of black and Hispanic attorneys in
large law firms, as demonstrated in Part I.B, because the Call to
Action was not fully embraced by client-corporations.154 The Call to
Action differed from the Statement of Principle in two important
ways: (1) it served as an explicit exhortation to client-corporations
to (2) institute a mandate requiring law firms to increase demo-
graphic diversity or be fired. Still, client-corporations largely failed
to take concrete action against law firms—namely, firing—that
failed to make tangible improvements to their demographic diver-
sity. Moreover, only approximately ninety general counsels signed
Palmore’s Call to Action,155 about one-fifth the amount that had
signed on to the Statement of Principle, suggesting that the vast
majority of client-corporations were not particularly concerned with
law firm diversity—or not concerned enough to translate their con-
cern into action. Wal-Mart, however, is one of the corporations that
did sign Palmore’s Call to Action.156
153. See Internal Initiatives, CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP, www.cravath.com/internalini-
tiatives (last visited Nov. 28, 2013) (“We develop and support internal employee affinity
groups, including African American/Black, Asian/Pacific Islander, Hispanic/Latino, LGBT
and women networks within the Firm. Our affinity groups provide associates with an addi-
tional network where they can seek advice and informal mentoring, as well as forge and
strengthen both professional relationships and friendships.”). For purposes of retention fo-
cused on promotion, affinity groups have been shown to lack effectiveness. This is because so
few members of the affinity group are in equity partner positions. Thus, the mentorship
needed to advance through the firm is not found in affinity groups. See, e.g., Frank Dobbin et
al., You Can’t Always Get What You Need: Organizational Determinants of Diversity Programs, 76 AM.
SOC. REV. 386 (2011) (discussing the lack of effectiveness of affinity groups at Fortune 500
companies due to a lack of top managerial positions by traditionally underrepresented
groups within top companies).
154. See generally INST. FOR INCLUSION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR
DIVERSITY: REALITY OR WISHFUL THINKING? 9 (2011), available at http://www.theiilp.com/re-
sources/Documents/IILPBusinessCaseforDiversity.pdf.
155. Amanda Bronstad, GCs and Law Firm Managing Partners to Convene Over Diversity, COR-
PORATE COUNSEL (Mar. 21, 2008), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?
id=900005506495.
156. See generally Elisabeth Frater, A Call to Action Continues: General Counsel Still Leading the
Way, MINORITY CORPORATE COUNSEL ASS’N, http://www.mcca.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=
page.viewpage&pageid=1618 (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
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2. Market Pressure in Practice
In 2005, Wal-Mart changed its policies regarding the outsourcing
of legal work after the company realized that, of the top one hun-
dred firms that handled Wal-Mart’s work, eighty-two of its
relationship partners were white males.157 A relationship partner is
the attorney in charge of the day-to-day interaction with the com-
pany and makes the decisions regarding the assignment of legal
work to his or her colleagues.158 Therefore, this makes the relation-
ship partner a person of great power at the firm. Wal-Mart realized
that women and people of color often were not given the opportu-
nity to serve in this role.159 Wal-Mart’s new policy required each of
its outside legal firms to “submit a slate of three to five lawyers for
[the relationship partner] role” that included at least one woman
and one person of color.160 At the time Wal-Mart made this an-
nouncement, its General Counsel, Thomas Mars, stated that Wal-
Mart was “terminating a firm right now because of their inability to
grasp our diversity expectations.”161
In 2006, the New York Times reported that Wal-Mart “dropped”
two law firms because of “unhappiness with the firms’ lack of diver-
sity.”162 Wal-Mart “also decided not to send any additional work to
several other firms.”163 A year after its initial announcement, Wal-
Mart had successfully made forty changes to the relationship part-
ners who handled the business with their corporation.164 The New
York Times article cited Palmore’s Call to Action as the prompting
of such efforts by companies like Wal-Mart.165 Even in 2006, how-
ever, with actual firings of law firms for failing to reach certain
diversity goals, the director of the office for diversity at the New
York City Bar stated that, “ ‘[L]aw firms have been able to be suc-
cessful while ignoring’ the hiring of more minorities . . . . ‘You
almost can’t ignore it anymore.’”166 Firms were still able to continue
157. See Karen Donovan, Pushed by Clients, Law Firms Step Up Diversity Efforts, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21, 2006, at C6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/21/business/21legal.
html?pagewanted=all; Meredith Hobbs, Wal-Mart Demands Diversity in Law Firms, LAW.COM
(July 6, 2005), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1120579809481.
158. Donovan, supra note 157.
159. See id.
160. Id.
161. Hobbs, supra note 157.




166. Id. (emphasis added).
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ignoring their low rates of women and people of color without fac-
ing serious repercussions. This is not surprising when one considers
that in July 2006, almost two years after Palmore posted and circu-
lated the Call to Action, Wal-Mart was one of the only widely-known
examples of a corporation actually firing “a law firm for lack of pro-
gress on diversity.”167 Wal-Mart’s actions serve as tangible proof that
law firm clients can exert significant influence over the culture at
law firms, but Wal-Mart is only one company, and currently there is
not a critical mass of client corporations taking similar actions.168
Anecdotal evidence demonstrates that the corporations most
willing to consider a law firm’s demographic diversity when making
hiring decisions have general counsels of color. For example, at the
2012 Just the Beginning Foundation (JTBF) conference, several
general counsels indicated that they expressly consider diversity in
hiring decisions.169 James Clarence Johnson, General Counsel at
Loop Capital Markets, stated that “I have fired firms” who could do
the work but were not sufficiently diverse.170 Alfreda Bradley-Coar,
Senior Executive and General Counsel with GE Healthcare-Ameri-
cas stated that she had sent away pitch-teams, a team put together
in an attempt to obtain legal business, of all white men.171 Maria
Green, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary of
Illinois Tool Works, indicated that she has fired firms who lacked a
slate of attorneys who are demographically diverse.172 These three
general counsels are black. Now, that is not to suggest that there are
not whites with similar concerns. The anecdotal evidence, however,
suggests that the corporations that are most willing to cease a rela-
tionship with a firm due to a lack of diversity typically have general
counsels of color.
167. Id.
168. See INST. FOR INCLUSION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 154. Wal-Mart has re-
mained aggressive in its efforts to mandate changes within large law firms. In 2011, Wal-Mart
stated that it wanted to be part of the decision-making process for determining who at a firm
received origination credit for Wal-Mart work. In other words, Wal-Mart wants to dictate who
gets credit for bringing in the money that Wal-Mart spends on legal fees at the firms. Partner
compensation is tied to the amount of business they bring in, and changing origination
credit for a company with as large a legal spend as Wal-Mart has the potential to shift the
balance of power at a firm to the partner of Wal-Mart’s choosing. The goal of Wal-Mart’s
policies is to ensure that law firms guarantee that racial and gender diversity is a priority from
the time associates are first year associates to the time they are equity partners. Wal-Mart
realized that some firms maintained a strategy whereby their young associate ranks were dem-
ographically diverse, but white men handled all of the real client contact (and ultimately
power at the firm).
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Furthermore, in 2012, the percentage of general counsels of
color in Fortune 500 companies was less than ten percent.173 The
very client-corporations that are being called on to insist on greater
demographic diversity within large law firms have yet to achieve di-
versity within their own ranks.174 This lack of diversity on the part of
corporate general counsel seems to have an effect on the amount of
pressure clients are willing to put on firms to increase their demo-
graphic diversity.175 Indeed, a 2011 study found that:
Corporate clients express a commitment to greater diversity
and, intentionally or not, imply to outside counsel that contin-
ued or additional business will flow as law firms manifest
support for and commitment to greater diversity. However,
corporate clients, at best, use diversity as one of many criteria
in selecting outside counsel and rarely implement strategies to re-
ward in-house counsel for choosing diverse outside counsel or bestow
173. Vivia Chen, Minority GC Rates Hit All-Time High, CAREERIST (Aug. 24, 2012), http://
thecareerist.typepad.com/thecareerist/2012/08/minority-gc-.html.
174. It should be noted that client-corporations are being encouraged to increase demo-
graphic diversity within corporations generally by the Securities and Exchange Commission,
which has adopted new rules requiring public companies to consider “diversity in the process
by which candidates for director are considered,” and now require public companies to dis-
close how they view diversity with respect to their boards. See Press Release, Secs. & Exch.
Comm’n, SEC Approves Enhanced Disclosure About Risk, Compensation and Corporate
Governance (Dec. 16, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-268.
htm; see also Luis A Aguilar, Commissioner, Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by SEC Com-
missioner: The Abysmal Lack of Diversity in Corporate Boardroom is Growing Worse (May 2,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch050211laa.htm.
175. The legal profession could incentivize client-corporations to increase diversity within
legal departments if NALP and the Minority Corporate Counsel Association (MCCA) began
consistent and transparent tracking and publishing of corporate legal department demo-
graphic diversity. In 2011, the MCCA and NALP partnered to publish a research study on the
diversity within 765 corporate legal departments. MINORITY CORPORATE COUNSEL ASS’N, SUS-
TAINING PATHWAYS TO DIVERSITY: A COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION OF DIVERSITY DEMOGRAPHICS,
INITIATIVES, AND POLICIES IN CORPORATE LEGAL DEPARTMENTS (2011), available at http://www.
mcca.com/_data/global/images/Research/MCCA_CLDD_Book.pdf. The data is presented
in the aggregate instead of publishing the demographic diversity of each corporate legal
department individually, which permits individual corporations to hide amongst their peers.
If NALP and the MCCA began transparent tracking and publishing of individual corporate
legal department demographic diversity, it would serve as an incentive for client-corporations
to increase their internal demographic diversity. Increasing attorneys of color within corpo-
rate legal departments and amongst general counsels would have a likely effect of increasing
the sustainable practice portfolio of demographically diverse attorneys. The Michigan study
found that “[a]ll Michigan alumni are disproportionately likely to serve same-race clients, so
minority alumni provide, on average, considerably more service to minority clients than
white alumni do.” See Lempert et al., supra note 46, at 401. Developing a sustainable practice
is a key component to winning the modern day Tournament of Lawyers.
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more business upon those firms that are succeeding in their diversity
endeavors.176
Client-pressure, arguably, would be the best source of market pres-
sure to induce large law firms to implement large structural
changes within their organizations that would allow them to retain
greater numbers of demographically diverse associates.177
While it should be noted that Palmore is continuing his efforts,
most recently through the creation of the Leadership Council on
Legal Diversity in 2009, the reality is that client-corporations still fail
to systematically fire firms that do not meet certain diversity stan-
dards.178 If clients were aggressively firing law firms with poor
demographic diversity, thus resulting in a loss of substantial reve-
nue for the firm and individual partners, large law firms would have
a serious mandate requiring them to make sweeping changes to en-
sure improvement. Thus, those hoping for a classic market solution
to the problem of low demographic diversity at large law firms have
176. INST. FOR INCLUSION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 154, at 8 (emphasis
added).
177. It is important to remember that there are potential downsides associated with pres-
suring large law firms to increase demographic diversity. It is not inconceivable that these
initiatives have forced law firms to focus more on their bottom line numbers and not on
ensuring the long-term success of demographically diverse attorneys. See Yolanda Young, Law
Firm Segregation Reminiscent of Jim Crow, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 17, 2008, 11:35 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/yolanda-young/law-firm-segregation-remi_b_91881.html (alleging
that “Covington began stockpiling its staff attorney ghetto with blacks and other minorities in
2005, shortly after the General Counsel of some of the country’s largest companies . . . [took]
a tougher stance on law firm diversity. . . . Covington has certainly diversified its firm; how-
ever, its attorneys are far from equals. The vast majority of Covington’s black attorneys do no
substantive work, have no control over their case assignments and no opportunity for ad-
vancement.”). Treating demographically diverse associates as mere numbers, or as a racial
commodity, is likely to inhibit effectiveness of diversity initiatives. See Nancy Leong, Racial
Capitalism, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2151, 2169–71 (2013); see also Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial at 4, Springs v. Mayer Brown, LLP, No. 09-CVS-12577 (N.C. Super. Ct. May 26, 2009),
available at http://abovethelaw.com/_old/Springs%20v%20Mayer%20Brown.pdf (“Springs
was hired, in whole or in part, because the Charlotte office needed to increase its number of
African American attorneys, as evidenced in part by [a white, male partner’s] year end per-
formance report when he brags that one of his 2007 accomplishments was to hire an African
American and two women, a double counting of Ms. Springs for both protected categories.
Upon information and belief, firm documents refer to the hiring of an African American as a
‘marketing tool.’ Springs was used as a marketing tool, asked to attend on behalf of Mayer
Brown minority Bar and other functions where diversity would be perceived as positive.”).
178. The goal of the Leadership Council on Legal Diversity is to promote “diversity
throughout the legal profession by involving top leaders at firms and legal departments.”
Karen Sloan, Mentorship Program Will Foster Diversity in the Profession, NAT’L L. J. (Mar. 2, 2011),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202484088283. The council includes
representatives from sixty-five corporations and one hundred law firms. In 2011, it estab-
lished a Fellows Program “to help diversify the legal profession by producing attorneys with
strong leadership and networking skills who enjoy relationships with industry leaders.” Id.
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been left waiting for client-corporations to take the issue more
seriously.
B. Retention-Limiting Bias, Discrimination, and Stigma
As is demonstrated above, the retention problem is well docu-
mented and supported by the available tracking data. The available
research suggests that the retention rate differentials are not fully
explained by the employment preferences held by black and His-
panic attorneys. Moreover, the retention problem has persisted
despite stated pressure from clients to remedy inequities within law
firms. The inquiry, therefore, turns to why there remain such stark
differences between attorneys of color and whites. There appear to
be three main causes for the retention rate differentials: structural
bias, aversive racism and implicit bias, and perceived affirmative ac-
tion-stigma.
1. Structural Bias
One cause of retention rate disparities is related to what Susan
Sturm calls “second generation bias”: “Structures of decision mak-
ing, patterns of interaction, and cultural norms often produce
‘second generation’ inequalities that are not immediately discerni-
ble at the level of the individual.”179 Sturm argues that “[u]nlike
first generation bias, these problems cannot be traced to deliberate
exclusions by identifiable bad actors.”180 Combating second-genera-
tion bias in large law firms is particularly complicated because it
includes structural bias. An example of structural bias might in-
clude an assignment system that lacks standardization or systematic
checks to ensure that all similarly situated associates are receiving
the same type of work.181
Because in modern day practice clients are attached to individual
partners and not the firm generally,182 partners are not likely to sur-
render their ability to dictate precisely which associates will work on
179. Sturm, supra note 14, at 286.
180. Id. at 280.
181. See, e.g., Roberto Concepción, Jr., Note, Organizational Citizenship Through Talent
Management: An Alternative Framework to Diversity in Private Practice, 42 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 43 (2008) (discussing how standardizing the assignment process at an accounting
firm remedies disparities between male and female accountants).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 131–33.
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matters that a partner owns. Law firms, unlike accounting or con-
sulting firms, operate as mini-fiefdoms.183 Thus, law firm
management is limited in its ability to force individual partners to
ensure that they distribute assignments equitably across associates.
Management’s limitations are exacerbated by the realities of lateral
partner movement,184 which increases the danger of the law firm
attempting to mandate large structural changes onto individual
partners and their ability to make unfettered choices regarding
staffing decisions. If the partner feels as if the law firm is interfering
with his autonomy and decision-making with regards to meeting his
client’s need, then the partner may leave the firm and join a new
firm with less onerous requirements. For example, when King &
Spalding attempted to restrict Paul Clement’s ability to take on an
unpopular representation, he lateraled to another firm and began
the representation that King & Spalding declined to allow him to
enter into.185 As a result, while there are many promising and likely
effective proposals that have been made suggesting structural
changes to law firms that might eliminate the effects of structural
bias, these types of structural changes aimed at decreasing inequi-
ties amongst demographic groups have largely been ignored by law
firms. The partnership aspect of the law firm business model associ-
ated with the ease of transferring to a competing firm makes
addressing workplace inequities within law firms even more chal-
lenging than doing so in organizations that have strong central
management control.
2. Aversive Racism and Implicit Bias
A second cause for the retention rate disparities between white
males and black and Hispanic attorneys appears to be rooted in
aversive racism. Aversive racism, as defined in the social psychology
literature, refers to those who “sympathize with victims of past injus-
tice, support the principle of racial equality, and regard themselves
as nonprejudiced, but at the same time possess negative feelings
and beliefs (which may be unconscious) about Blacks.”186 The word
183. See supra text accompanying notes 131–33.
184. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1875 (“Clients and lawyers became more
mobile, as long-term retainer relationships with clients gave way and the lifetime commit-
ment of lawyers to firms was threatened by the lateral movement of lawyers.”).
185. Ashby Jones, After King & Spalding Drops DOMA Case, Clement Drops Firm, WALL ST. J.
L. BLOG (Apr. 25, 2011, 12:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/04/25/after-king-spald-
ing-drops-doma-case-clement-drops-firm/.
186. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 112, at 44.
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“racism” obviously evokes strong reactions, and it is not the intent
of this Article to suggest that white, male equity partners at elite,
large law firms are afflicted by racist tendencies. It is the suggestion
of this Article that lawyers are affected by the same psychological
developments as the rest of society, and the social psychology re-
search indicates that many white Americans developed negative
feelings against blacks and Hispanics “through early socialization
coupled with almost unavoidable biases associated with categorizing
people into different groups.”187 This categorization of people into
groups is normal. As part of normal psychological processes, people
categorize those they interact with into “ingroups and outgroups”
or “we’s and they’s.”188 “People respond systematically more favora-
bly to others whom they perceive to belong to their group than to
different groups.”189
Think about diehard Notre Dame Fighting Irish and Michigan
Wolverines football fans. A diehard Notre Dame fan is going to re-
spond more positively to someone wearing a Notre Dame Fighting
Irish jersey than to a person wearing a Michigan Wolverines jersey.
The fan sees the Notre Dame jersey and categorizes the person as
part of the ingroup of Notre Dame football fans. This categoriza-
tion can be quite efficient. If one were to enter a crowded bar to
watch a football game between Notre Dame and Michigan, the No-
tre Dame fan is going to gravitate towards the other Notre Dame
fans. This gravitation may be all for the best in diminishing poten-
tial disputes amongst vying rivals within the bar. This same type of
ingroup favoritism, or loyalty even, can be found within law firms.
For example, a partner engaged in interviewing candidates for
summer associate positions may respond more favorably to candi-
dates who attended his same college or law school. The partner is
able to immediately place that candidate into an “ingroup.” The
partner knows how rigorous an academic environment the student
is learning in and may have had some of the same professors. This
ingroup categorization allows the partner, at least temporarily, to
find a point of commonality with the candidate. This is interesting
because, depending on the view of the social categorization, that
same student that was a part of the ingroup could easily be placed
into an outgroup by that same partner and lose favorability. If, for
example, the partner values his membership in the Federalist Soci-
ety more than he values his membership as an alumni of the law
187. Id. at 45.
188. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 2, at 111 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189. Id.
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school and the candidate is a member of the American Constitu-
tion Society, then the partner may perceive the candidate as being a
part of an outgroup and cease to judge the candidate in a more
favorable manner. That does not mean the partner will discrimi-
nate against the candidate for his or her membership in the
outgroup; it just means the candidate is no longer viewed more favor-
ably than others.
The categorization of racial ingroups and outgroups is quite simi-
lar, except that social norms have trained most people in the
modern day workplace against conscious discrimination against in-
dividuals on the basis of their race. “[B]ecause aversive racists
consciously recognize and endorse egalitarian values and because
they truly aspire to be nonprejudiced, they will not discriminate in
situations . . . when discrimination would be obvious to
others . . . .”190 Thus, it is quite unlikely that an aversive racist would
discriminate against a clearly more qualified black over a clearly less
qualified white. “However, the unconscious negative feelings and
beliefs that aversive racists also possess will produce discrimination
in situations in which normative guidelines are weak or when nega-
tive actions toward a Black person can be justified or rationalized
on the basis of some factor other than race.”191 Thus, if the qualifi-
cations between the black and white candidate are relatively
fungible—a black man from Harvard who was on the moot court
board and a white man from Stanford who was an editor of the
international law journal—the aversive racist will favor the person
who fits most easily into his or her “ingroup,” and for the majority
of equity partners in law firms, that individual may often be the
white man. One social psychologist has posited that “for aversive
racists, part of the problem may be that there is no emotional con-
nection to Blacks and other minorities and they do not regard them
as part of their circle of inclusion for sharing and caring as readily
as they accept [w]hites.”192
An important concept within the “aversive racism framework is
the conflict between the denial of personal prejudice (i.e., explicit
attitudes) and the underlying unconscious negative feelings and be-
liefs (i.e., implicit attitudes and stereotypes).”193 In the context of
elite, large law firms, implicit and unconscious biases towards blacks
and Hispanics have been routinely identified as a challenge to
190. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 112, at 45–46.
191. Id. at 46.
192. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 2, at 112.
193. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 112, at 53.
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achieving workplace equity.194 Implicit bias includes automatic bi-
ases in how a person thinks about, feels toward, and treats members
of other groups.195 The person’s mind deploys these biases without
being conscious or aware. Jerry Kang and Mahzarin Banaji have ex-
tensively documented the existence of implicit bias within
workplaces and demonstrated that “the presence of implicit bias
can produce discrimination by causing the very basis of evaluation,
merit, to be mismeasured.”196 Thus, not only are black and His-
panic attorneys in a racial outgroup to the majority of equity
partners at the firm, the effects of implicit bias may also cause their
work to be improperly evaluated and measured. Hence, a mistake
by a black or Hispanic associate may oftentimes be more detrimen-
tal to the black or Hispanic associate’s career than it would be to a
white associate’s career.
3. Perceived Affirmative Action-Stigma
A third cause for the retention rate differentials appears to be a
result of “perceived affirmative action-stigma.” The perception that
all black or Hispanic associates have benefited from affirmative ac-
tion in both law school admissions and the firm hiring process
solidifies the idea that whites are more qualified than blacks and
Hispanics. For example, one black associate recently stated that “he
sometimes felt there was a ‘rebuttable presumption’ that he was
there to fill a quota and was not as qualified as white colleagues.”197
This perception creates taint before the black or Hispanic associ-
ates are provided their first assignments in the firm, making this
perception difficult to combat.
In elite law firms, perceived affirmative action-stigma leads to a
belief that blacks and Hispanics are intellectually inferior,198 greater
difficulty by blacks and Hispanics in finding whites to mentor them
194. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative
Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6 (2005) (noting the “voluminous
empirical evidence of the prevalence of unconscious biases against non-white minorities”);
Peters, supra note 73, at 643 (noting that the partnership admissions process is susceptible to
cognitive unconscious biases concerning race) (quoting Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the
Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987)).
195. See Ascanio Piomelli, Cross-Cultural Lawyering by the Book: The Latest Clinical Texts and a
Sketch of a Future Agenda, 4 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 131, 171 (2006).
196. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision of “Affirm-
ative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1066 (2006).
197. Nelson D. Schwartz & Michael Cooper, Racial Diversity Efforts Ebb for Elite Careers,
Analysis Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
05/28/us/texas-firm-highlights-struggle-for-black-professionals.html?pagewanted=all.
198. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 506.
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and give them counseling about how to succeed at the firm,199 and
blacks and Hispanics facing greater costs from making mistakes
than their white peers because the mistakes serve to reinforce no-
tions that these groups are inferior.200 These false perceptions
regarding blacks and Hispanics inhibit attorneys of color from de-
veloping the human capital that they need to build and sustain a
practice, which requires “training, mentoring, and an appropriate
array of challenging work assignments.”201 These increased chal-
lenges for black and Hispanics persist despite a sustained effort to
create market pressure to incentivize firms to improve demo-
graphic diversity.
The perceived affirmative action-stigma has likely been exacer-
bated in recent years by the highly publicized work of Richard
Sander.202 Sander argues that blacks and Hispanics are the benefi-
ciaries of large preferences in admission to elite law schools, which
translates into low grades. He argues this “ensure[s] that almost no
minorities will graduate from any top-fifty school with high
grades.”203 He goes on to argue that “blacks entering large firms
have generally performed less strongly in terms of GPA in law
school relative to their white counterparts.”204 His research implies
that black and Hispanic attorneys are less qualified than white attor-
neys. Putting aside the question of whether law school grades are
predictive of success in legal practice,205 Coleman and Gulati noted
the danger of this sweeping conclusion:
The harm of Sander’s article is that it will contribute to the
stereotyping that already undermines the success of black asso-
ciates in elite corporate law firms. . . . To the extent there is
material in his article that will be understood as empirical con-
firmation of the lack of qualification of black students, the
199. See, e.g., Id. at 568; cf. Carl G. Cooper, Diversity: Denied, Deferred or Preferred, 107 W. VA.
L. REV. 685, 695 (2005) (“Again, the most important thing you should take away from this is,
as a typical law student, if you go to a law firm that does not have a strong mentoring pro-
gram and you are not totally self-sufficient, you may be in trouble within two years.”).
200. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 571.
201. Galanter & Henderson, supra note 9, at 1914 (discussing the effects of the elastic
tournament on attorneys of color).
202. See generally Sander, supra note 117, at 1755.
203. Id. at 1776.
204. Id. at 1787.
205. Sander has been criticized for his conclusions, and others looking at the same data
set Sander utilized have determined that the lack of success in large law firms by black and
Hispanic attorneys is rooted in a lack of mentorship. Monique R. Payne-Pikus et al., Experienc-
ing Discrimination: Race and Retention in America’s Largest Law Firms, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV. 553,
559–60 (2010).
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article imposes a high cost on those who need no additional
obstacles placed before them.206
Moreover, the dangers associated with being a perceived “affirma-
tive action user” have proven to have tangible effects within law
firms.
In an empirical study evaluating the effects of “initial assign-
ment” for employees who utilize reduced-hours programs within
law firms, the findings suggested that “[v]ulnerable employees need
to solidify their standing as professionals in the eyes of supervisors
and clients before” becoming users of “employee-rights programs”
similar to affirmative action programs.207 By being associated with
these types of programs early on, “initial powerful supervisors may
negatively evaluate [users] . . . and choose not to provide them with
a stream of reputation-building projects.”208 Even when users are
provided with such projects, “the employees will have exposure to
supervisors and clients under circumstances in which their ability,
commitment, and marketability is already in doubt because of
their” association with the program.209
Thus, the perception that blacks and Hispanics as a group are
the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs—the classification
of these associates into the outgroup of the less qualified—likely
contributes to poor employment outcomes for black and Hispanic
attorneys. The initial perception that these attorneys lack the neces-
sary qualifications decreases the time spent mentoring and
developing them, which dooms these associates to fail within the
Tournament of Lawyers, where success depends largely on ade-
quate training. As Wilkins and Gulati noted over a decade ago,
“associates will gradually be divided into two broad categories: those
who have received training . . . and those who have not. . . . Al-
though the boundaries between these two groups are fluid, they
nevertheless will tend to be self-perpetuating. . . . Those who have
not been trained face diminishing opportunities for success.”210
Those diminished opportunities contribute to increased retention
rate disparities between black and Hispanic associates and white
associates.
206. James E. Coleman, Jr. & Mitu Gulati, A Response to Professor Sander: Is It Really All About
the Grades?, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 1823, 1825–26 (2006).
207. Forrest Briscoe & Katherine C. Kellogg, The Initial Assignment Effect: Local Employer




210. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 539–40.
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C. Instilling Loyalty and Voice
The three sets of challenges to achieving greater retention of
black and Hispanic attorneys within large law firms essentially boil
down to one point of commonality: Black and Hispanic attorneys
within large law firms are not receiving the mentoring and training
necessary to ensure that they remain at firms at the same rates as
white attorneys. Thus, the question is what the difference is be-
tween whites who succeed in firms and those that do not, and if the
mechanisms leading to success of white attorneys can be replicated
to achieve greater retention of some black and Hispanic attorneys.
This Article argues that successful whites within large law firms have
been instilled with loyalty to the firm and encouraged to utilize the
options of loyalty and voice over exit. Blacks and Hispanics as an
outgroup, however, are not being instilled with loyalty at the same
rates as whites, leading them to lack loyalty to the firm and utilize
the exit option over the voice option at much higher rates.
1. Exit, Voice, and  Loyalty
In 1970, Albert O. Hirschman authored a work addressing re-
pairable lapses of economic actors.211 If an organization’s product,
performance, or service deteriorates, then the management of the
organization discovers the deterioration through one of two
routes.212 The first is the exit option—the members leave the organ-
ization.213 The second is the voice option—“the organization’s
members express their dissatisfaction directly to management or to
some other authority to which management is subordinate or
through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen.”214
A person utilizing the exit option shifts to another organization,
thereby using “the market to defend his welfare or improve his
position.”215
If enough people exit, then the observant organization will be
alerted to the fact that something is wrong with its product, per-
formance, or service. In the employment context, the employer will
know that for some reason workers are dissatisfied and seek a new
place of employment. Voice also serves to alert the employer that
something has gone awry, but voice “is a far more ‘messy’ concept
211. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5.
212. See id. at 4.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 15.
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because it can be graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to
violent protest; it implies articulation of one’s critical opinions
rather than a private, ‘secret’ vote in the anonymity of [the mar-
ket]; and finally, it is direct and straightforward rather than
roundabout.”216 Those exercising voice are attempting:
to change, rather than to escape from, an objectionable state
of affairs, whether through individual or collective petition to
the management directly in charge, through appeal to a
higher authority with the intention of forcing a change in
management, or through various types of actions and protests,
including those that are meant to mobilize public opinion.217
Whether an employee will exercise voice over exit will depend, in
part, on “the prospects for the effective use of voice.”218 If the em-
ployee believes voice may be effective, s/he may delay exit while
waiting to see if exercising voice will cause a positive change to the
objectionable state of affairs. Exercising voice, however, can be risky
and has considerable costs associated with it: “[t]he presence of the
exit alternative can therefore tend to atrophy the development of
the art of voice.”219 Thus, in some instances it can look as if “voice is
likely to play an important role in organizations only on condition
that exit is virtually ruled out.”220
Contrary to this assumption, Hirschman demonstrated that there
are actually two principal determinants of an individual’s readiness
to resort to voice when exit is possible. First is “the extent to which
customer-members are willing to trade off the certainty of exit
against the uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated
product.”221 Second is “the estimate customer-members have of
their ability to influence the organization.”222 The former is clearly
related to the concept of loyalty, which is a “special attachment to
an organization,” but the two factors are often intertwined:
A member with a considerable attachment to a product or or-
ganization will often search for ways to make himself
influential, especially when the organization moves in what he
believes is the wrong direction; conversely, a member who
216. Id. at 16.
217. Id. at 30.
218. Id. at 37.
219. Id. at 43.
220. Id. at 76.
221. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 5, at 77.
222. Id.
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wields (or thinks he wields) considerable power in an organi-
zation and is therefore convinced that he can get it “back on
track” is likely to develop a strong affection for the organiza-
tion in which he is powerful.223
Thus, “loyalty holds exit at bay and activates voice.”224 Loyalty is
also necessary for developing strong membership in the organiza-
tion because it has the potential to “neutralize . . . the tendency of
the most quality-conscious . . . members to be the first to exit. . . .
Thus loyalty, far from being irrational, can serve the socially useful
purpose of preventing deterioration from becoming cumulative, as
it so often does when there is no barrier to exit.”225 As a result,
finding mechanisms to incentivize loyalty within employees can pro-
vide tangible benefits to the organizations by preventing mass
exodus of employees, thereby exacerbating whatever problem is
motivating employees to exit. By encouraging loyalty, employers are
provided an opportunity to rectify problems without sacrificing
members of their workforces.
2. Loyalty and Voice in the Tournament
As is indicated by Wilkins and Gulati’s work, elite, large law firms
are already quite good at instilling loyalty in a certain subset of asso-
ciates—the “Superstars.”226 Part I stressed that it is most valuable to
the firm to employ associates who need little or no training and
who can perform tasks competently and quickly because monitor-
ing is difficult and expensive.227 If an associate proves that s/he can
fulfill these requirements, then the partner will begin to invest time
in training the associate, to ensure s/he continues to competently
and quickly complete assignments even as the level of difficulty in-
creases.228 Eventually, law firm associates are put on one of two
tracks: a training track and a flatlining track.229 The training track
223. Id. at 77–78.
224. Id. at 78.
225. Id. at 79.
226. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 534.
227. Id. at 538–39.
228. See id.
229. The existence of these two tracks stops the large law firm from employing a standard
tournament theory because “firms do not run a competition in which every associate is given
an equal chance to succeed.” Id. at 541.
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associates are the Superstars, while those on the flatlining track are
the paperwork associates.230
When the partner, who has limited time and resources, invests in
the associate to train him or her, the associate develops a sense of
loyalty towards that partner and vice versa. More importantly, when
the associate feels that members of the firm are investing time and
resources in him or her, the associate develops a sense of loyalty
towards the firm generally, and a specific sense of loyalty towards the
investing individuals. This sense of loyalty incentivizes the associate
to utilize voice over exit if and when an objectionable state of affairs
arises at the firm.
Thus, the question becomes why there are fewer black and His-
panic associates than white associates being placed on the training
track and instilled with loyalty,231 which hastens the exit of black
and Hispanic attorneys from elite, large law firms at higher rates
than whites.232 An example demonstrates the problem. Two associ-
ates of the same year at a top law firm are working on a case
together. One associate is considered demographically diverse, and
one is a white male. The demographically diverse associate notices
that the white male is getting the better and more substantive as-
signments. The demographically diverse associate, however, cannot
identify exactly why. Both associates graduated from top law schools
and both completed federal court clerkships. What does the demo-
graphically diverse associate do to obtain a more equal distribution
of work? While there are some who argue that black and Hispanic
associates are simply less qualified than whites,233 the majority of
230. See Wilkins & Gulati, Reconceiving the Tournament of Lawyers, supra note 18, at 1611–12.
Paperwork associates are engaged in less-sophisticated, yet necessary, work on behalf of the
firm and are not gaining substantive skills in the course of completing their assignments. See
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
231. This Article does not argue that developing a sense of loyalty to an employer is ra-
tional. It is often quite irrational since the employment-at-will doctrine permits an employer
to fire an employee without cause at any time. Rationality aside, a sense of loyalty has an
effect on how employees react to their employment situation.
232. This same concept incentivizes partners with large books of business to attempt to
change policies and procedures within a firm instead of moving to another firm that already
has the conditions the partner wants. Firms that have equity partners of color must work
quite hard to ensure loyalty to the firm so that other law firms do not poach these individuals.
233. As stated previously, the scholar most well known for arguing that black and His-
panic attorneys leave large law firms due to inferior qualifications is Richard Sander. See
generally Sander, supra note 117. Sander’s “Mismatch Theory” is based, in part, on his belief
that racial preferences within law schools harm blacks and Hispanics, which starts a ripple
effect that undermines the careers of black and Hispanic attorneys. Critiques of Sander’s
work abound, and entire law review symposia have been dedicated to detailing the objections
to Sander’s theories and noting flaws in his empirical assessments. See generally Danielle Hol-
ley-Walker, Race and Socioeconomic Diversity in American Legal Education: A Response to Richard
Sander, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 845 (2011). A broad-based discussion of the issues raised by
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scholars and practitioners who have addressed this question find
that the root of the problem lies in a lack of mentoring in the form
of training, professional advice, and psychological support234 of
black and Hispanic associates.235
The lack of effective mentoring relationships for black and His-
panic attorneys in large law firms, who are relative newcomers to
the Tournament of Lawyers, is not altogether surprising given the
realities associated with second-generation bias, aversive racism,
and implicit bias.236 In large law firms, the most valuable mentors
appear to be equity partners, and the vast majority of equity part-
ners are white men. This is because they are the ones who have a
Sander in this Article would not add much to what has already been a robust scholarly debate
on this issue, so the author, who does not agree with Sander’s conclusions, defers to the work
of others on this topic. See, e.g., Gregory Camilli & Kevin G. Welner, Is There a Mismatch Effect
in Law School, Why Might it Arise, and What Would it Mean?, 37 J.C. & U.L. 491 (2011) (detail-
ing several empirical flaws in Sander’s work); Darrell D. Jackson, Sander, the Mismatch Theory,
and Affirmative Action: Critiquing the Absence of Praxis in Policy, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 245 (2011)
(collecting citations of prior critiques of Sander’s work); Richard Lempert, Reflections on Class
in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 683 (2011); Payne-Pikus et al., supra note
205 (looking at the same data set as Sander and concluding that black and Hispanic attor-
neys fail to thrive due to lack of mentoring instead of inferior ability); David B. Wilkins, A
Systematic Response to Systemic Disadvantage: A Response to Sander, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1915 (2005).
234. In mentor-protégé relationships, significant career support was given, and they pro-
vided “important psychosocial support to the parties as well, helping participants develop
and maintain self-esteem and professional identity.” David A. Thomas, Racial Dynamics in
Cross-Race Developmental Relationships, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 169, 169–70 (1993).
235. See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 199, at 695; Payne-Pikus et al., supra note 205, at 560
(“Partner contact and mentoring is increasingly recognized as a key process and source of
dissatisfaction and departures from law firms, especially for African American lawyers. In
contrast with human capital theory, an institutional discrimination theory suggests that dis-
parity in social contacts with partners and mentoring experiences with partners, rather than
disparities in merit and performance, can explain the ‘paradox’ of high rates of minority
lawyers’ dissatisfaction and departures after being hired into large law firms.”); Wilkins, supra
note 10, at 428 (“The failure of minorities and women to find mentors, and therefore to gain
access to the training track, is one of the primary reasons why these lawyers leave large law
firms in greater numbers and at the earlier stages in their careers than their white peers.”).
236. There are individuals who believe that whites and blacks cannot form authentic
mentoring relationships, but this belief has been dispelled by social science research for over
two decades. In 1993, scholars demonstrated that success in cross-racial mentoring depended
on the “parties preferred strategy for dealing with racial difference—either denying and sup-
pressing it or discussing it openly—and whether both parties preferred the same strategy
influenced the kind of relationship that developed. Only when the parties preferred the
same strategy did the more supportive mentor-protégé relationship develop.” Thomas, supra
note 234, at 169. More recently, a 2008 study of the role of cross-racial mentoring using the
responses of 139 members of the National Black MBA Association found that success in
mentoring relationships was more attributable to “attitudinal similarity” than “demographic
similarity.” See Brian P. Brown et al., The Role of Mentoring in Promoting Organizational Commit-
ment Among Black Managers: An Evaluation of the Indirect Effects of Racial Similarity and Shared
Racial Perspectives, 61 J. BUS. RES. 732 (2008).
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vote in the Tournament of Lawyers.237 Bias found within the law
firm makes it difficult for blacks and Hispanics to gain access to the
resource of mentoring, which is quite scarce in highly leveraged
environments.238
Moreover, “[s]tudies of cross-racial . . . mentoring relationships
in the workplace repeatedly demonstrate that white men feel more
comfortable in working relationships with other white men.”239 This
may be, in part, a result of the reality that social relationships leave
“some black lawyers at a distance from their white colleagues . . . .
‘For the most part, they don’t go to church together on Sunday
enough, they don’t have dinner together enough, and they don’t
play enough golf together to develop sufficiently strong relation-
ships of trust and confidence.’”240 Additionally, “This natural
affinity [amongst whites] makes it difficult for blacks [and Hispan-
ics] to form supportive mentoring relationships.”241 This lack of
mentoring can often lead to demographically diverse attorneys be-
ing valued for their demographic status242 instead of their
contribution to the legal team—a common objectionable state of
affairs within large law firms.
For example, at the 2012 JTBF Conference, a young, black, male
lawyer243 asked an expert panel about what should be done when
firms include persons of color in pitches to clients to obtain busi-
ness and then fail to staff the included persons of color on the
matter. The emotion in his voice seemed to indicate that this had
occurred to him, and that he felt frustrated and used as a result.244
This devaluing of skill, intelligence, and work product may contrib-
ute to challenges retaining these groups within law firms.
Therefore, those concerned with increasing retention of blacks
and Hispanics in large law firms must focus on changing the behav-
ior of two groups of people: (1) white males and (2) black and
Hispanic associates. White males need to be incentivized to develop
mentoring relationships with black and Hispanic associates, which
237. See The Demographics of Equity—An Update, supra note 7 (noting that eighty-five per-
cent of equity partners are men, fifteen percent are women, and just under five percent are
male or female minorities).
238. As leverage in large law firms increased, it became increasingly more difficult to
obtain mentoring. Firms that employ a one-to-one leverage are more likely to have increased
mentoring of all associates. See Raasch, supra note 25, at 34 (“When leverage was one-to-one,
mentoring was part of the process.  At higher levels, it becomes less likely.”).
239. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 569.
240. Schwartz & Cooper, supra note 197.
241. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 569.
242. See generally Leong, supra note 177, at 2155–56.
243. It became clear during the exchange with the panel that the young man was a
Harvard Law School graduate.
244. Based on author’s independent observation at conference.
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will in turn instill loyalty and encourage the utilization of voice over
exit in black and Hispanic associates. The trickle-down effect of
these incentives will be to decrease the rates of attrition by black
and Hispanic associates in large law firms. Part III suggests three
proposals that can be employed to start this process.
III. SOLUTIONS FOR IMPROVED RETENTION
The proposals suggested in this Part utilize soft incentives to en-
courage white men, at least for a time, to consider black and
Hispanic attorneys within law firms to be part of their “ingroup,”
which will allow these attorneys of color to receive the benefit of
favoritism. This favoritism will hopefully translate into being put on
the training track by equity partners who will invest the time re-
quired for loyalty to be instilled in the associates. This investment of
training will hopefully develop the trust necessary for the black and
Hispanic associate to feel comfortable exercising his or her voice
instead of immediately turning to the option of exit when what
Hirschman calls dissatisfactory states of affairs occur. Developing
proposals of this nature is challenging because it is difficult to pro-
vide these incentives at a structural level. As explained above, law
firms are essentially independent businesses run through a central
organization. As such, the challenge is to find a method of design-
ing solutions that motivate individual partners—not just the law
firm as an organization.
The suggestions proposed are not quick fixes. Their implementa-
tion will require years to effectuate long-term cultural change
within large law firms. Still, they are not dependent on major struc-
tural changes to aspects of the large law firm model like the
evaluation and assignment processes at firms.245 Additionally, it is
easy for individual attorneys and law firms to opt-out of participa-
tion in these programs by preserving individual actors’ abilities to
245. For example, Tiffani Darden suggested an associate evaluation process based on
transformative performance review, which would encourage mediation between an associate
and the supervising attorney in instances of poor reviews by adding an objective assessment
from the diversity officer to the subjective evaluation process. See Tiffani N. Darden, The Law
Firm Caste System: Constructing a Bridge Between Workplace Equity Theory & the Institutional Analy-
ses of Bias in Corporate Law Firms, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 85, 107 (2009). In a 2008
article, it was suggested that law firms import a successful initiative used by Deloitte & Touche
USA LLP to increase the retention and promotion of women in the workplace by measuring
the gender distribution of work assignments to combat the informal work assignment sys-
tems’ tendency to assign out less desirable work to women. Concepción, supra note 181; see
also Kang & Banaji, supra note 196, at 1091–92 (discussing changes implemented at Deloitte
& Touche USA LLP).
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choose to participate in these efforts. The proposals allow large law
firms to retain their extremely profitable business model while com-
bating the ills associated with workplace discrimination on an
individual, attorney-to-attorney level. These initiatives are not with-
out some costs, but those being prompted by the proposals will
alter “behavior in a predictable way without” being mandated into
“any options or significantly changing . . . economic incentives.”246
For those law firms that are already outlaying a significant amount
of money on diversity initiatives like those described in Part II,
these proposals may serve to be a more efficient use of some of
those diversity dollars.
The hope is that these proposals, over time, will create lasting
cultural changes within large law firms that will make remaining at
the firm a viable option for more black and Hispanic attorneys. The
point is not to keep every black and Hispanic attorney at the firm,
since that defies the logic of the tournament model and more gen-
eral attorney preferences. Instead, the point is to motivate those
who would choose to remain, but for the occurrence of a dissatisfac-
tory state of affairs, to express their concerns and stay the course of
learning the skills necessary to build a sustainable practice instead
of prematurely exiting to another employment setting.
A. Billable Diversity Hours
This proposal is aimed at changing the culture of elite, large law
firms over the long term by designing a new set of choices aimed at
incentivizing white males’ participation in diversity initiatives when
they enter the firm as junior associates. By encouraging greater par-
ticipation in these efforts by white males, the hope is that a new
ingroup will be created of individuals who assist in diversity efforts,
and the interactions amongst white men and other demographic
groups during the course of performing this work will help to de-
crease the stigma associated with the perception that black and
Hispanic attorneys have been the beneficiaries of affirmative action.
Currently, individuals discussing diversity initiatives within large law
firms often group attorneys into two groups: diverse and non-di-
verse attorneys. The term non-diverse typically means straight,
white men. Thus, white men are not being treated as a legitimate
part of the ingroup that is the community concerned with diversity.
Indeed, the current culture within large law firms often explicitly
246. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 6.
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excludes white men from the diversity conversation, creating a situ-
ation where white men become accustomed to not participating in
diversity initiatives while they are associates. When these white men
become partners—and in 2011, 2012, and 2013 white men made
up over eighty-four percent of partners in elite, large law firms—
they continue to remain uninvolved with these initiatives. This pro-
posal aims to change that phenomenon by encouraging greater
participation in diversity initiatives by all members of the organiza-
tion. Over time, the hope is that greater participation by white
males in diversity initiatives will create opportunities for the devel-
opment of relationships between white males and persons of color,
thereby ensuring persons of color have access to the training
needed to gain the skills necessary to build their own sustainable
practice and bring tangible value to the firm.
1. Background Rationale
There are two types of work in law firms: work that is considered
billable and work that is not. Billable work is performed for a client
that pays the firm, typically at an hourly rate based upon the attor-
ney’s seniority with the firm. Work that is not billable is work that is
not billed out to a client. Most firms have some sort of explicit billa-
ble hours requirement, but even those that do not often have an
unwritten expectation of a certain amount of billable hours each
year that attorneys are expected to contribute.247 In addition to bill-
able work, attorneys are often asked to engage in non-billable
activities beyond mere administrative tasks.248 These non-billable ac-
tivities can be seen as important, but they typically are not
considered when firms evaluate whether attorneys have successfully
met the necessary requirements to receive their base compensa-
tion.249 In addition, non-billable activities are typically not
considered when bonus determinations are made for salaried attor-
neys in the firm (e.g., nonequity partners),250 and periodic financial
247. Fortney, supra note 69, at 175–76 (noting that the majority of firms surveyed had
billable hours requirements).
248. Joan C. Williams & Veta Richardson, New Millennium, Same Glass Ceiling?  The Impact
of Law Firm Compensation Systems on Women, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 619 (2011) (noting that
tension occurs “when a firm encourages partners to do important non-billable work, such as
marketing, training, and so on, but ‘rewards those activities marginally in favor of billable
hours/revenue’ collected”).
249. See id.
250. Fortney, supra note 69, at 176 (“In the survey, the majority of managers and supervis-
ing attorneys reported that associate bonuses are largely based on billable hours
production.”).
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incentives via year-end bonuses are an important part of the incen-
tive structure within large law firms.251
As a result, non-billable activities are typically engaged in only by
individuals at large law firms who lack sufficient negotiating power
to reject the non-billable work, typically achieved by having more
important billable work to complete instead of the non-billable
work, or who see some sort of concrete benefit resulting from the
non-billable activity. For example, an associate may sacrifice billable
hours to work on a non-billable law review article in exchange for a
byline. The associate may have sacrificed monetary compensation
in the form of her or his end-of-year bonus in the process, but s/he
received an additional publication to add to his or her resume.
While not a monetary transaction, the value in working on the arti-
cle is tangible to the associate and to those around the associate,
such as supervising attorneys and potential clients.
Currently, diversity initiatives at large law firms lack a tangible
benefit for the vast majority of those employed at the firm. A black
or Hispanic associate may find value in working on these issues be-
cause he or she wants to encourage more people who look like him
or her to remain members of the organization. In effect, he or she
wants to cease his or her extreme minority status at the firm. That
type of incentive, however, does not transfer to the individuals who
are largely ignored by firm diversity initiatives, namely white
males.252 Working on diversity issues does not have the same value
as working on, for example, a law review article because working on
diversity issues has an attenuated relationship to one’s law practice,
whereas working on the law review article or some other sort of
publication relates directly to a legal issue, typically one of interest
to a subset of the firm’s clients.253 As a result, the vast majority of
individuals currently working on diversity issues at large law firms
are non-white males, the targets of the firm’s diversity efforts.254
251. Wilkins & Gulati, An Institutional Analysis, supra note 4, at 519 (“Firms also seek to
induce effort by promising employees a reward (commonly either a cash bonus or a lucrative
promotion) if they can credibly signal that they have successfully performed their jobs over a
specified period of time.”).
252. This is not to suggest that there are no white males who genuinely care about and
participate in attempting to eliminate bias in the workplace. There are.
253. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103,
112 (2000) (“Because of stereotypes, not only are outsiders [e.g., persons of color] more
likely to say yes to certain tasks, they are also more likely to be asked to perform certain tasks.
As we will show, the cost of taking on too many tasks (especially what we call ‘lumpy citizen-
ship tasks’) undermines an outsider’s ability to succeed within the workplace.”).
254. See, e.g., Tristin K. Green, Race and Sex in Organizing Work: “Diversity,” Discrimination,
and Integration, 59 EMORY L.J. 585, 600 (2010) (“[R]ace- and sex-based decisions organizing
work can disadvantage women and minorities by imposing extra work on members of those
groups. Imagine a law school, for example, at which women and minority professors are
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The diversity committee has become the near universal, and ar-
guably the most important, component of large law firms’ diversity
initiatives.255 The diversity committee is sometimes comprised solely
of partners from various offices of the firm, with one partner who
serves as the chair of the committee.256 There are, however, diver-
sity committees at law firms that are comprised of partners,
associates, and administrative staff.257 There does not appear to be a
standard industry practice for determining how a firm should struc-
ture this type of organizational resource, and each committee may
handle different assignments and tasks.258 At a minimum, these
committees are typically concerned with the recruitment and reten-
tion of demographically diverse attorneys.259 As a result, the
diversity committee is customarily involved in all of the diversity ef-
forts outlined in Part II, as well as other initiatives that the firm
believes will increase its ability to recruit and retain demographi-
cally diverse attorneys. Law firm management should encourage
greater involvement by white males in the diversity committee’s ac-
tivities. To do that, law firm management, which is a choice
architect, must employ a little added incentive to encourage partici-
pation by the individual attorneys.
2. Proposal
Choice architects in law firm management who truly want to ob-
tain buy-in from all attorneys in the firm’s diversity initiatives must
determine a mechanism for making the time spent on those non-
asked to attend more student recruitment functions, pose for more pictures and answer
more media inquiries, and serve on more faculty panels. Even if the dean makes these re-
quests with laudable goals in mind . . . , the women and people of color who are asked to do
this extra work may suffer real job-related consequences. Time spent recruiting students and
talking to the media, after all, is time spent away from other career-building work. Similar
effects are likely to carry over into non-academic settings.”); see also Carbado & Gulati, supra
note 253.
255. See, e.g., Diversity, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, http://www.wlrk.com/diver-
sity/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2013) (2012 Vault #1); Mission Statement, supra note 143 (2012 Vault
#2); Diversity Committee: History, supra note 141 (2012 Vault #18).
256. See Diversity Task Force, JONES DAY, http://www.jonesdaydiversity.com/taskforce/ (last
visited Nov. 29, 2013) (encompassing attorneys from all the domestic offices and chaired by a
firm-wide Diversity Partner).
257. See, e.g., Our Diversity Committee, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP, www.arnoldporter.com/
about_the_firm_diversity_our_committee.cfm (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
258. See generally MINORITY CORPORATE COUNSEL ASS’N, EXAMINING THE ROLE OF THE LAW
FIRM DIVERSITY PROFESSIONAL 5 (2009), available at http://www.alanet.org/diversity/MCCA
ExaminingLawFirmDiversityProfessionalsReport.pdf.
259. See, e.g., Diversity & Inclusion, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILI-
ATES, www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=178 (last visited Nov. 29, 2013).
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billable activities worthwhile to the attorneys. The easiest, most di-
rect way for encouraging greater participation in diversity efforts at
the associate level is to tie those hours directly to compensation—
count hours spent on diversity initiatives as billable. If the hours are
credited towards billable hours targets, time spent on diversity ini-
tiatives ceases to be a type of community service event and instead
will be perceived as real work that matters to the firm. If greater
representation of traditionally underrepresented groups is truly im-
portant to law firm management, management should be willing to
value time spent achieving it and demonstrate to each and every
attorney in the firm why participating in diversity initiatives has a
tangible benefit to them (and their pocketbooks).
There are a variety of benefits associated with this proposal. In
the short-term, implementing this proposal should have an immedi-
ate effect on the conduct of non-partner attorneys at firms whose
compensation is tied to achieving billable hours targets. For exam-
ple, it instantly transforms a request to attend a mentoring event
sponsored by the diversity committee from extra non-billable work
to a different, yet still billable, hour. Thus, it incentivizes associates
to participate in diversity efforts on behalf of the firm. In addition,
the proposal should broaden the pool of attorneys willing to spend
time on diversity efforts, thereby lessening the burden on the few
attorneys currently participating in such efforts. It is well known
that attorneys of color and women often bear the brunt of partici-
pating in diversity initiatives. By broadening the pool of associates
willing to participate in this initiative, this burden will start to lift
slightly. By lessening this burden, those currently carrying the brunt
of the diversity work can reallocate that time towards clients’
chargeable work, which will benefit these attorneys’ quest to remain
on the training track within the firm.
Over the long-term, treating diversity hours as billable for pur-
poses of compensation is an incremental step and a soft incentive
that will slowly change the culture of the firm and the incentive
structure for white males to participate in diversity efforts. If a firm
were to immediately adopt this proposal, its next incoming class of
first-year associates would walk in the door knowing that time spent
on diversity initiatives would be considered in the yearly calculation
of their billable hours target and bonus. Every associate would have
an incentive to participate, even if, for example, it was for just a few
hours by attending a diversity reception. For those associates who
are encouraged to participate voluntarily in the diversity initiatives,
it would eventually become the cultural norm to remain engaged in
diversity-related efforts. As they remain at the firm and, for a few,
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eventually become equity partners, that cultural norm will perme-
ate throughout all levels of the firm. This little incentive over time
has the potential to change people’s views on diversity initiatives
from something “over and above” the minimum requirements of
their position to a routine part of their working life.
More importantly, the participation of white males in the diver-
sity initiatives will allow law firm management to create
opportunities that promote the establishment and development of
relationships between white males and other demographic groups.
Research in organizational behavior has found that opportunities
of this nature allow the natural formation of sponsor-protégé rela-
tionships, where the mentor provides career support, and mentor-
protégé relationships, where the mentor goes beyond career advice
and assists in developing a professional identity. These relationships
will form by allowing white male and black and Hispanic attorneys
to find points of what is known as attitudinal similarity. Research
shows that “perceived attitudinal similarity, in terms of general out-
look, values, and problem-solving approach” affects protégés’
support and satisfaction with the mentoring relationship.260 When
mentors and mentees have similar attitudinal similarity, the cross-
racial mentoring relationship is often more successful.261 Over time,
this proposal can assist in breaking down some of the barriers to
forming mentorships created by aversive racism, implicit bias, and
perceived affirmative action-stigma. This would, of course, occur
slowly, but it has the potential to change norms within firms.
An example may be instructive. Training Superstar, a white male,
begins at Fantastic Law Firm (Fantastic) as a second-year associate
following a clerkship with Judge Importantous. During orientation,
Training is informed that time spent on diversity efforts will be
credited towards his billable hours requirement. Training remem-
bers this and attends diversity committee sponsored events
occasionally during his tenure at the firm. Training understands, at
least at an unconscious level, that he is part of the ingroup of indi-
viduals who are welcome to participate in diversity efforts. For
Training, periodic attendance at diversity events becomes a habit,
but he typically spends only about five to ten hours per year at di-
versity related events. When Training is in his sixth year at the firm,
he is asked by the Diversity Committee to give a presentation at one
of the annual diversity retreats on eDiscovery issues, an area of
Training’s expertise. The eDiscovery group at Fantastic lacks demo-
graphic diversity, and the Diversity Committee thinks that it might
260. Brown et al., supra note 236, at 733.
261. Thomas, supra note 234, at 169–70. See generally Brown et al., supra note 236.
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be able to garner interest of attorneys of color to get involved in the
eDiscovery group through Training’s presentation. This requires
about ten hours of preparation time in addition to the time to
travel to and from the retreat, as well as the time spent giving the
presentation. Because this time counts towards Training’s billable
requirement, he does not feel as if the time spent preparing for and
giving the presentation at the retreat is taking Training away from
his billable work, and he agrees to participate.
After the presentation, Training meets a new first-year associate,
Hopeful Star, a Hispanic woman. Hopeful asks Training in-
sightful262 questions regarding the presentation, and Training is
quite impressed. A week later, Hopeful emails Training an article
discussing new eDiscovery issues, and Training is grateful for the
new information. A couple months later, Partner Trainmister, a
white male, ropes in a tricky eDiscovery matter, staffs Training on
the matter, and tells Training to find a junior associate to help with
the new case. Training remembers how engaged and interested
Hopeful was in issues of eDiscovery, and he emails her to see if she
has availability to assist. Hopeful has indicated that she is part of the
ingroup of those interested in eDiscovery issues, so Training is
treating her more favorably by seeking her out for the assignment.
She accepts, very happy to have finally landed a project with Partner
Trainmister, who is legendary for his ability to train new associates.
The hypothetical could be played out further, but the basic point
has been made. By incentivizing the white, male senior associate to
attend the diversity retreat, a set of choice architects at the firm, in
this case the diversity committee, created an opportunity where he
could begin to develop a relationship with an individual outside of
his demographic group. This, in turn, allowed the white, male se-
nior associate to categorize the female, Hispanic junior associate as
part of his ingroup of those interested in eDiscovery. Encouraging
white males to develop working relationships with individuals
outside of their demographic group helps to combat the effects of
bias and discrimination. The other effect of this scenario, however,
is that the Hispanic female junior associate in this situation ends up
being thankful for the assistance in getting an assignment working
with a partner well known for his training abilities. Eventually, work-
ing on the project and being a part of the team translates into a
262. This hypothetical depends on the white male recognizing that Hopeful’s questions
were insightful. It depends on the one-on-one interaction helping to fight against stereotypes
Training may have regarding Hispanics that may unconsciously cloud his judgment of Hope-
ful. Thus, it has limits, but by increasing opportunities of this nature, the stereotypes just
might start to change.
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special attachment to the firm, and this attachment will deter her
from making a sudden exit should an objectionable state of affairs
occur during her tenure at the firm.
The obvious objection to this proposal is that law firms are in
business to make profits, so a compensation regime tied to client
billable requirements makes economic sense. Because diversity
hours are not billable to a client, they should not be treated as billa-
ble for purposes of meeting a billable hours requirement or
considered in bonus determinations.
This objection is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it is not en-
tirely clear that the cost to the law firm would be all that significant.
The salary of nonequity attorneys in large law firms is tied directly
to the hours billed by the attorney, but the money brought in by
today’s law firms is not as closely tied to the hours billed by attor-
neys. Many law firm partners, in an effort to get paid, often write-off
a subset of hours billed by attorneys before submitting the bill to
clients. In some instances, clients arrange reduced or alternative
billing arrangements with the firm prior to the beginning of the
relevant representation.263 Significantly, some clients have even
stopped paying for the work of junior associates because they do
not want to pay for the law firm to train associates.264 Thus, permit-
ting billable diversity hours would add a small amount to the
hundreds, if not thousands, of hours that law firms already fail to
recoup directly from clients.265 Moreover, most large law firms have
already implemented a similar program to what is suggested here
with respect to their pro bono policies.266 Large law firms often pro-
vide billable hours credit for time spent on pro bono activities for at
least fifty, and in many cases unlimited, pro bono hours.267 These
263. See Bernard A. Burk & David McGowan, Big But Brittle: Economic Perspectives on the
Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 37 n.94.
264. Id. at 58.
265. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Firms Wave Goodbye to Billing for Research Costs, ABA J. LAW SCRIB-
BLER (Nov. 14, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/firms_
wave_goodbye_to_billing_for_research_costs/ (noting that clients are “increasingly primed
to demand discounts, balk at hourly rates and refuse to pay for associate lawyers,” leaving law
firms to absorb costs like legal research).
266. The motivation behind creating billable credit for pro bono hours came as a result
of the quickly increasing demand for lawyers, so law students and the profession needed a
mechanism for encouraging greater pro bono participation from individuals throughout the
profession. Thus, the policy of billable credit for pro bono hours was a response to explicit
suggestions from the legal profession. See Cynthia R. Watkins, Note, In Support of a Mandatory
Pro Bono Rule for New York State, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 177, 194 (1991) (“To provide additional
incentives, the plan should also encourage firms to count pro bono work, or a portion
thereof, as ‘billable hours,’ and to consider pro bono activities in their decisions regarding
promotions, bonuses and partnership.”).
267. See A Look at Associate Hours and At Law Firm Pro Bono Programs, NAT’L ASS’N FOR LAW
PLACEMENT (April 2010), http://www.nalp.org/july2009hoursandprobono (noting that a
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efforts have been largely successful.268 If large law firms would allow
for even just fifty hours of billable hours credit towards time spent
on diversity initiatives, the hypothetical discussed above could easily
become a reality.  Additionally, large law firms could leverage their
diversity programs to attract clients in much the same ways they uti-
lized pro bono program—by publicizing their efforts to clients,
inviting clients to special diversity programs, and partnering with
clients on diversity initiatives—which would provide an added mon-
etary benefit to adopting this proposal.
Second, incentivizing attorneys of color to remain at the firm has
the potential to save large law firms a substantial amount of money
if they are attorneys that the firm would need to replace. Studies
have demonstrated that “ ‘attrition costs firms between $200,000
and $500,000 per associate, including lost revenues, lost training
expenses, lost institutional knowledge, and replacement costs.’”269
In many instances, retaining attorneys of color is much cheaper
than having to recruit new ones.
“maximum [number of pro bono hours counted as billable], if there is one, is most com-
monly 50 hours, reported by 51% of offices, followed by 100 hours, reported by 20% of
offices.”). It is important to note that the treatment of pro bono hours varies quite broadly
amongst law firms, and in some firms the pro bono hours kick in only after a person meets a
certain billable hours threshold. Thus, pro bono is not a perfect comparator of what is being
suggested here.
268. See Robert Granfield, Institutionalizing Public Service in Law School: Results on the Impact
of Mandatory Pro Bono Programs, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 1355, 1359 (2007) (“In many law firms, the
institutionalization of pro bono has been demonstrated by the creation of new professional
roles such as pro bono partners or managers who coordinate the pro bono initiatives of the
firm and the activities of lawyers. In addition to the formalization of bureaucratic roles, some
law firms now allow lawyers to credit some proportion of pro bono work to their billable hour
requirements. Several large law firms have become signatories of the ‘Law Firm Pro Bono
Challenge,’ an initiative launched by the ABA in 1993 and now operating under the aegis of
the Pro Bono Institute located at Georgetown University Law Center. The Challenge requires
law firms to demonstrate an institutional obligation to pro bono by ‘promulgating and main-
taining a clearly articulated and understood firm policy’ and by ‘using their best efforts to
ensure compliance’ with the goal of providing three to five percent of resources to pro bono
causes. ‘In its first two years, there were over one hundred and seventy signatories to the
Challenge, which included many of the nation’s elite firms.’ Currently, a third of the nation’s
large law firms have accepted the Challenge.”) (citations omitted); see also Scott L. Cum-
mings, The Future of Public Interest Law, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 355, 363 (2011)
(discussing increase of pro bono work).
269. See Douglas E. Brayley & Eric S. Nguyen, Good Business: A Market-Based Argument for
Law Firm Diversity, 34 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 11 (2009) (quoting Elizabeth K. McManus, Intimida-
tion and the Culture of Avoidance: Gender Issues and Mentoring in Law Firm Practice, 33 Fordham
Urb. L.J. 217, 222 (2005)).
SPRING 2014] Retaining Color 629
B. The “Justice” Effect
This proposal aims to change the culture of elite, large law firms
over the long term by designing a new set of choices that will en-
courage the equity partners in large law firms to include the Chief
Diversity Officer (CDO) as an equity partner of the firm, to include
the CDO as a member of top management committees, and to in-
clude persons of color and women on the most powerful firm
committees. Again, this proposal is aimed at creating a new expec-
tation within law firms to include persons of color and women as
part of the ingroup of law firm management. Including the CDO,
persons of color, and women on these prestigious committees, will
enable them to influence the decision-making of the firm by influ-
encing their white, male colleagues. Importantly, increasing the
demographic diversity in top management positions has been
shown to improve demographic diversity throughout an organiza-
tion, even when the demographically diverse members of the
committee are not explicit champions of diversity.270
1. Background Rationale
Oftentimes, the mere presence of a person of color within a
group has the ability to change the group dynamics and decision-
making.271 This effect has been demonstrated time and again in the
Supreme Court.
When discussing the impact of Justice Marshall on his Supreme
Court colleagues, it is widely “acknowledged that his very presence
exerted a gravitational pull more powerful than his single vote.”272
Justice Scalia explained that “Marshall could be a persuasive force
just by sitting there,” and noted that Marshall “wouldn’t have to
open his mouth to affect the nature of the conference and how
seriously the conference would take matters of race.”273
270. See generally Dobbin et al., supra note 153.
271. A similar effect has also been seen at the appellate level. A recent study demon-
strates that adding a black judge to a panel with two non-black judges increases the
likelihood that affirmative action plans will be upheld. See Jonathan P. Kastellec, Racial Diver-
sity and Judicial Influence on Appellate Courts, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 167, 167 (2013). Studies have
also shown that having a woman on a three-judge panel of the U.S. Courts of Appeals pro-
duces statistically significant outcomes in sex discrimination cases. See Lee Epstein et al.,
Constitutional Sex Discrimination, 1 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 63 (2004).
272. See Adam Liptak, The Waves Minority Judges Always Make, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2009, at
WK1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/31/weekinreview/31liptak.html.
273. See id.
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Moreover, in Virginia v. Black, Justice Thomas demonstrated the
import and effect an opinion from a respected colleague may have
on a small decision-making body.274 Black dealt with Virginia’s law
banning cross burning. It is commonly accepted by members of the
legal community that the following exchange, prompted by Justice
Thomas, changed the tone of questioning, and perhaps the ulti-
mate outcome of the Supreme Court, in Black:
QUESTION: Mr. Dreeben, aren’t you understating the—the
effects of—of the burning cross? This statute was passed in
what year?
MR. DREEBEN: 1952 originally.
QUESTION: Now, it’s my understanding that we had almost
100 years of lynching and activity in the South by the Knights
of Camellia and—and the Ku Klux Klan, and this was a reign
of terror and the cross was a symbol of that reign of terror.
Was—isn’t that significantly greater than intimidation or a
threat?
MR. DREEBEN: Well, I think they’re coextensive, Justice
Thomas, because it is—
QUESTION: Well, my fear is, Mr. Dreeben, that you’re actu-
ally understating the symbolism on—of and the effect of the
cross, the burning cross. I—I indicated, I think, in the Ohio
case that the cross was not a religious symbol and that it has—
it was intended to have a virulent effect. And I—I think that
what you’re attempting to do is to fit this into our jurispru-
dence rather than stating more clearly what the cross was
intended to accomplish and, indeed, that it is unlike any sym-
bol in our society.275
Justice Marshall and Justice Thomas are considered political po-
lar opposites, and yet their presence as equally vested members of
the Supreme Court ingroup impacted their colleagues’ decision-
making. This can easily be replicated in the law firm context, and
has already been seen within corporations.276
274. 538 U.S. 343 (2003); see also, Adam Liptak, Strip Search of Girl by School Officials Seeking
Drugs Was Illegal, Justices Rule, N. Y. TIMES, June 26, 2009, at A16, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/06/26/us/politics/26scotus.html (noting Justice Ginsburg’s belief that
“her colleagues, all men, had failed to appreciate what [the female plaintiff] had endured”).
275. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–23, Black, 538 U.S. 343 (No. 01-1107), availa-
ble at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/01-1107.pdf.
276. See Dobbin et al., supra note 153, at 386 (“Firms that lack workforce diversity are no
more likely than others to adopt [diversity] programs, but firms with large contingents of
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2. Proposal
a. Chief Diversity Officer
Many law firms employ a Chief Diversity Officer whose sole func-
tion and role is to focus on diversity initiatives at the firm, although
the precise job descriptions of these officers are often poorly de-
fined.277 The CDO is often responsible for developing initiatives to
assist in the hiring and retention of demographically diverse associ-
ates.278 The individual is frequently a salaried, former practicing
attorney.
This structure severely limits the effectiveness of the CDO be-
cause the people with power at firms are equity partners, which
leaves a nonequity partner CDO without true power within the
firm. As such, the CDO, the person directed to spearhead diversity
initiatives at the firm, should be an equity partner. The person
should have the ability to passionately engage, and in some in-
stances rebuke, their colleagues without being concerned about the
reprisal of job termination. This can be the case only if the person
is an equity partner. The CDO should employ individuals with ex-
pertise in areas like organizational behavior and human resources
to ensure that the diversity initiatives employed by the firm include
strategies that will actually result in improving demographic diver-
sity. The importance of employing this type of structure was
recently highlighted in the media.279 In 2008, the CDO at Thomp-
son & Knight was a partner who was “not afraid to press the issue of
hiring minorities.”280 When the CDO left, “she was replaced by an
associate with less influence.”281 Reports from current and former
partners indicate that since the change from a CDO who was a part-
ner to one who was an associate, “the diversity committee meets less
often, and the firm has fewer black lawyers than before.”282
Once the firm has incorporated the CDO as a member of the
firm’s ingroup of equity partners, this person suddenly has a seat at
the table and a vote. The most effective CDOs will be given an auto-
matic position on top management committees that make decisions
women managers are more likely to do so.”); David A. Carter et al., Corporate Governance,
Board Diversity, and Firm Value, 38 FIN. REV. 33, 51 (2003).
277. See MINORITY CORPORATE COUNSEL ASS’N, supra note 258.
278. See generally Cooper, supra note 199 (explaining the appropriate role of the Chief
Diversity Officer in the firm and authored by the then CDO at Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Nich-
olson Graham).
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regarding recruitment, retention, and promotion-to-partner deci-
sions. Moreover, the CDO is uniquely positioned to attempt to
enact a limited amount of policies aimed at combating structural
bias. The CDO can track demographically diverse associates’ time
and for what partners they are working, as well as schedule qualita-
tive interviews with demographically diverse associates to ensure
they are developing professionally at the same speed as their white,
male colleagues. The CDO, upon finding disparities in the alloca-
tion of work, can bring this to the attention of the individual
partners, who may honestly not have noticed an inequitable distri-
bution of work, and encourage them to assign work or increase the
difficulty of assignments towards particular associates. There are, of
course, limitations on what a CDO can do within the organization,
but his or her ability to effectuate change by becoming an insider of
the partnership while also advocating for demographically diverse
associates is a uniquely powerful role.
b. Persons of color and females in top management
Persons of color and female equity partners should be members
of the top committees at large law firms. Law firm management,283
the choice architects, should ensure that women and persons of
color are part of the group of candidates from which selection for
these top committees occurs. If the partnership elects the members
of the executive committee, then attorneys of color and women
should be part of the slate of candidates, and they should receive
the support of law firm management.284 Law firm management
should send a strong signal that these attorneys are part of the in-
group of attorneys within the firm suited to participate in law firm
management.
For example, compensation committees tend to have between
five and ten members, although some are made up of many more
283. The individuals in law firm management are often also the partners with the largest
books of business. As has been explained repeatedly, power within law firms is often tied to
one’s ability to leave the firm with clients. See David Wilkins, Partners Without Power? A Prelimi-
nary Look at Black Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15, 16 &
n.5 (1999) (citing ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 224–28 (1988) (noting that lawyers with access to important clients
exercise disproportionate control over firm management)).
284. Because the partners with the most power, i.e., those with the biggest books of busi-
ness, often have a disproportionate amount of input in decisions of this nature, it would be
beneficial, although not a necessary component of this proposal, if clients expressed a desire
for more demographic diversity in top law firm committees directly to their relationship
partners.
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members.285 The membership of the committee is “most commonly
determined by election by the partnership.”286 The reason this com-
mittee is powerful should be self-evident—the committee
determines the compensation received by the equity partners in the
firm. Thus, these individuals are instantly made persons of impor-
tance within the firm. To date, there is very little demographic
diversity on compensation committees. A recent study researching
women in large law firms found that the representation of women
on compensation committees is extremely low with about half of
respondents having one woman on their compensation commit-
tees, one-fifth having none, and another fifth having two women on
their compensation committees.287 Representation by persons of
color on compensation committees was low or virtually nonexistent.
According to the survey, ninety percent of firms had no women of
color and seventy-five percent of firms had no men of color on their
compensation committees.288
Another recent study found that 84.1 percent of demographi-
cally diverse partners have served on the firm’s diversity committee,
while only 8.1 percent have ever served on the firm’s executive com-
mittee.289 When minority- or women-owned firms were removed
from the sample, the percentage of demographically diverse part-
ners serving on diversity committees jumped to 94.6 percent.290
Indeed, 81.4 percent of demographically diverse attorneys have
served on the hiring committee.291 Thus, although demographically
diverse attorneys are serving on committees, they are not serving on
the ones most likely to effectuate long-term change within the firm.
This trend needs to be reversed.
Including respected colleagues of color at the highest echelon of
firm management can fundamentally change the rules under which
the firm functions. When a trusted colleague who is known as a
thoughtful, reasonable, and smart individual raises certain con-
cerns that are important to them, the other members of his or her
peer group are more likely to take those concerns more seriously
than they otherwise would. The value of relationships cannot be
overstated in the effort to achieve buy-in from those who have not
experienced the issue personally. Moreover, the development of
these relationships between demographically diverse and white,
285. Williams & Richardson, supra note 248, at 606.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 607.
288. Id. at 606.
289. INST. FOR INCLUSION IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 154, at 11.
290. Id.
291. Id.
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male attorneys will help to combat the effects of aversive racism,
implicit bias, and perceived affirmative action-stigma, which should
aid in improving the ability of black and Hispanic associates to ob-
tain mentorship from white males.292 In addition, a recent study of
Fortune 500 companies found that organizations with high rates of
women in upper management had more demographic diversity
overall when compared with their peers.293 Females and persons of
color on the committees will be able to utilize their positions of
power within the firm to effect lasting cultural changes within the
organization.294 Thus, the mere presence of more demographically
diverse equity partners on these committees will incentivize white
males, who still likely will be the overwhelming majority on the
committee, to join in implementing policies and procedures that
will ultimately increase the effectiveness of the firm’s demographic
diversity initiatives.295 By allowing women and attorneys of color to
become part of this elite ingroup within the law firm, their opinions
and input will be looked upon more favorably and have greater
impact.
Moreover, seeing persons of color and women in these positions
of power, as well as the firm’s increased commitment to and imple-
mentation of effective diversity initiatives, will increase the loyalty
that black and Hispanic attorneys feel towards the firm. This will in
turn incentivize blacks and Hispanics to utilize voice over exit and
assist in lowering attrition rates within these demographic groups.
This is because the presence of persons of color in positions of
power in conjunction with a tangible commitment to diversity gen-
erally will increase the belief by black and Hispanic attorneys that
exercising voice will in fact result in a direct influence on the firm’s
conduct if and when an objectionable state of affairs occurs.
This proposal is essentially costless to the firm and has the added
benefit of demonstrating to clients and the public that the firm has
put attorneys of color in positions of power, which may assist in
efforts to attract clients concerned with diverse representation.
Moreover, studies demonstrate that greater demographic diversity
292. Their presence on these committees will assist in combating ingroup favoritism,
which is a “form of bias that discriminates in favor of” white men. Williams & Richardson,
supra note 248, at 609.
293. See Dobbin et al., supra note 153, at 388.
294. This is not to suggest that a person of color or woman is expected to be the voice for
blacks and Hispanics on these top committees. Even if the demographically diverse individu-
als on the committee never mention issues related to race, gender, or diversity, the research
still suggests that their presence will lead to greater demographic diversity throughout the
institution. See id. Their presence helps to change the group decision-making, which in turns
has an effect of improving demographic diversity.
295. See, e.g., id. at 406.
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within large law firms has a positive correlation with profitability,
suggesting that this proposal may actually be of economic benefit to
the firm.296
There are, however, some limitations associated with this propo-
sal. First, many large law firms will be unable to increase the
number of equity partners of color on their top management com-
mittees because they do not have equity partners of color within
their organizations.297 While this concern is obviously valid, most
firms do have female equity partners. The effect of women in top
managerial roles is an increased commitment to diversity within the
organization as a whole, which in turn may assist the firms without
equity partners of color into developing some.298
Second, there may be a concern that persons of color who be-
come members of these top committees may be considered mere
tokens. To combat this, the person of color must be thought of as a
respected colleague and not as the person filling the, for example,
black or woman seat on the committee. If the person on the com-
mittee is a full member of the committee, with full voting rights,
and the individual pulls his or her fair share of the work needed to
complete the committee’s goals, then the concerns regarding
tokenism should be assuaged. The concerns likely will not be elimi-
nated, as there will often be those who will believe the individual on
the committee did not earn the position. If the members of the
committee know and respect the person of color or woman on the
committee and internally categorize the person as a legitimate
member of the “ingroup,” that person’s ability to effectuate change
by his or her presence and deeds will remain strong.
Third, there may be concerns that demographically diverse attor-
neys will become over-burdened if they are asked to serve on too
many committees within the firm. This concern is reasonable. Thus,
this proposal does not aim to add another committee to the demo-
graphically diverse attorney’s set of committee memberships within
the firm. Instead, it suggests substituting membership on the top
firm committees for membership on other firm committees.
296. See generally Brayley & Nguyen, supra note 269.
297. As demonstrated by the recent NALP report, only five percent of equity partners at
all reporting law firms are attorneys of color. This leaves a very small pool of equity partners
of color to access for these roles. See The Demographics of Equity—An Update, supra note 7.
298. Again, this does not require or expect that women become the voice for black and
Hispanic associates.
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C. Mediating Bias
This proposal is an attempt to design an industry-wide solution to
remedying bias-related incidents in light of the lack of political will
within large law firms to implement many of the organization-wide
changes needed to eliminate the effects of structural bias. Bias-re-
lated incidents within the employment setting greatly inhibit the
development of loyalty between the employee and the employing
organization. Finding mechanisms to mediate bias-related incidents
in a manner that feels safe to the employee—in this case the black
or Hispanic attorney—is of great importance. This proposal aims to
change the culture of elite, large law firms by creating a new choice
for attorneys wishing to lodge a complaint after experiencing a bias-
related incident.
This is, however, a backstop proposal that is likely less beneficial
than the first two presented because “[e]ven though appropriate
structural changes . . . can potentially have dramatic impact on even
subtle forms of bias, more informal forces, such as social norms and
personal standards[,] can also bring about significant social
change.”299 The first two proposals aim to remedy the sources of
bias, while this proposal addresses specific bias-related incidents.
That said, providing avenues for airing grievances regarding dis-
criminatory events has a certain amount of value, and the current
systems available to law firm attorneys in need of such a resource
are extremely limited. This proposal provides an additional option.
1. Background Rationale
The class action has been an invaluable tool used by traditionally
underrepresented groups to incentivize private employers to deter
discriminatory activities. For example, in 1994 black employees
filed a class action lawsuit against Texaco Inc. claiming that there
had been numerous problems with discrimination throughout the
company, they were receiving salaries less than those of their peers,
and they were being passed over for promotions because of their
race.300 This case was followed in 2000 with a class action lawsuit
filed against the Coca-Cola Company by black current and former
employees, claiming that they were paid significantly less than
whites, were passed over for promotions, and were subject to an
299. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 112, at 53 (citations omitted).
300. See, e.g., Erika Hayes James & Lynn Perry Wooten, Diversity Crises: How Firms Manage
Discrimination Lawsuits, 49 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1103, 1103 (2006).
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internal evaluation system biased against promoting and rewarding
black employees.301 The lawsuits settled out of court with significant
concessions by the corporations to ensure an increase in demo-
graphic diversity, as well as equal and fair treatment going
forward.302 High profile class action lawsuits such as these have the
ability to greatly influence the conduct of an organization.
The class action tool is not appropriate for attempting to incen-
tivize large law firms to ensure that their supervising attorneys are
minimizing bias-related incidents. The number of demographically
diverse attorneys in one large law firm is much lower than the dem-
ographically diverse professional employees at an organization like
Coca-Cola, and the more appropriate route would be individual
civil actions. The problem with the individual civil action is that an
attorney filing such an action may be seen as overly sensitive or as a
liability by his or her firm or other future prospective employers if
s/he decides to file a public lawsuit. Moreover, the cost of litigation
is quite high, and the chances of winning discrimination suits
against law firms have proven to be slight.303 So what institutional
and structural mechanisms are in place that could incentivize large
law firms in the same way the class action lawsuit has pushed corpo-
rations towards greater demographic diversity? Another type of
institutional oversight can be found in a division of the Department
of Labor, namely the Veterans Employment and Training Service
(VETS).304
Under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA),305 when a member of the Army
Reserves is deployed to Iraq, for instance, his or her private sector
employer must provide reemployment options upon the service
member’s return.306 Employers do not always adhere to this re-
quirement, however. Under USERRA, the service member has a few
different options, but basically s/he may file a private civil action
against the employer, or s/he may lodge a complaint against the
employer with VETS, which investigates and adjudicates the claim
301. See, e.g., Greg Winter, Coca-Cola Settles Racial Bias Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2000, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/11/17/business/coca-cola-settles-racial-bias-
case.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
302. See James & Wooten, supra note 300, at 1103–04; Winter, supra note 301.
303. See Peters, supra note 73, at 632 (discussing unsuccessful lawsuits filed under Title
VII contesting partnership decisions against King & Spalding and Katten Muchin).
304. See Veterans’ Employment and Training Services (VETS), U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://
www.dol.gov/vets/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2013). VETS is an example of what is found through-
out antidiscrimination statues, including Title VII, which is an attempt to incentivize
employers not to discriminate.
305. Pub. L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149.
306. See 38 U.S.C. § 4312 (2012).
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on behalf of the service member.307 The VETS investigations are
not highly publicized, but they are an effective, secondary option
for individuals who cannot avail themselves to legal tools such as
the class action lawsuit and who do not want to file a private civil
action. The service member has an avenue to effectively adjudicate
his or her claims, and the employer does not have its name dragged
through the press as someone unfriendly to veteran employees. At-
torneys of color at law firms would likely benefit from a similar
institutional choice for mediating bias-related incidents.
2. Proposal
The American Bar Association (ABA) is a powerful choice archi-
tect within the legal profession. It sets policy for attorneys generally
and publishes best practices in a variety of areas. It does so by draw-
ing on the expertise of its members—lawyers. The ABA should
encourage states, by making changes to the ABA’s model discipli-
nary rules,308 to add an additional set of complaints that will be
heard by state hearing committees currently charged with adjudi-
cating disciplinary complaints against individual attorneys. The
committees should begin receiving, investigating, and mediating
complaints of bias-related incidents within legal departments.309 In
addition, the ABA should encourage attorneys to report bias-re-
lated incidents by accepting reports of bias and issuing informal
ethics opinions discussing the incidents in an effort to provide gui-
dance to the legal profession on how to combat discrimination.
Lawyers in states adopting this additional scope of authority to
the traditional disciplinary hearing committee would be given an-
other outlet for filing and mediating bias-related incidents that
occur in law firms. State supreme courts routinely diverge from
what is suggested by the ABA model rules. Thus, there is no reason
to believe this proposal forbids other options for the individual
307. See DEP’T OF LABOR, VETERANS EMP’T & TRAINING SERV., YOUR RIGHTS UNDER
USERRA (2008), available at http://www.dol.gov/vets/programs/userra/USERRA_Private.
pdf.
308. MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT (2007).
309. There was another proposal encouraging action by the ABA published by a student
in 2006. It suggests that the ABA develop a certification program in diversity for law firms
aimed at ensuring associates of color have adequate support during “their track toward part-
nership,” while improving the “‘bottom line’ for firms that invest the resources to
incorporate diversity within their culture.” Peters, supra note 73, at 652. The details of this
proposal are quite interesting and worth serious consideration by the ABA.
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states.310 If adopted by a state, the existence of the system would
provide an avenue for attorneys to file grievances when bias-related
incidents occur within legal departments.311 In addition, the ABA
could encourage the reporting of bias-related incidents by expres-
sing its willingness to provide guidance on how to deal with and
prevent incidents similar to those reported. The lawyers filing com-
plaints would not be required to do so or forbidden from choosing
another source of relief or no relief at all. By utilizing the existing
structure and staff of the ABA and the state hearing committees,
additional costs to the ABA and states would be largely minimal.
The goal of permitting the bias-related complaint to be filed with
the state disciplinary board and mediated by the hearing committee
would not be to publicize every complaint. It would also not be to
exercise formal discipline against individual attorneys unless an ac-
tual violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct was found. The
goal would not be to result in a formal hearing for all, or even the
majority, of the bias-related complaints filed.312 Instead, the goal of
this proposal is to create an outlet for providing outside, objective
guidance to the complaining attorney (does the complained of inci-
dent seem legitimately problematic?) and, if necessary, to the legal
department (why did this incident occur, why was it problematic,
and how can similar incidents be avoided in the future?). Over
time, the state hearing committee could track complaints and
trends and publish an annual report with specific, yet anonymous,
examples of bias-related incidents within legal departments. For le-
gal departments meeting a certain threshold of legitimate
complaints, the hearing committee might consider issuing a public
letter of reprimand.
The goal of permitting the ABA to receive reports of bias-related
incidents and providing guidance through informal ethics opinions
is to give the complaining attorney an opportunity to express his or
her voice and receive input on whether the complaint is valid, while
also allowing the attorney to attempt to protect his or her anonym-
ity. It also provides a service to the profession generally by allowing
310. Compare MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 308, with
Disciplinary Process, SUPREME CT. OHIO & OHIO JUD. SYS., http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/
Boards/BOC/Flowchart_legal.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2013) (demonstrating the adoption
of a disciplinary structure different than the one recommended by the ABA).
311. These legal departments would include law firms, but they would also include many
governmental legal offices.
312. The vast majority of disciplinary complaints filed with state disciplinary boards never
rise to the level of a formal investigation or hearing. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G.T.
Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative Attorney Discipline, 12 NEV. L.J. 253, 258 (2012).
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broad access to the ABA’s advice on how to address and prevent
similar bias-related incidents.
The hope is that the availability of mechanisms for voicing com-
plaints will instill a sense of power in attorneys of color. Currently,
the power at large law firms rests solely in the hands of the equity
partners, very few of whom are persons of color. For attorneys of
color, this reality can create a sub-culture of individuals who feel as
if they do not have real power to effectuate change at the firm,
which in turn decreases the sense of loyalty the attorneys have to-
wards the firm and hastens exit when discriminatory acts occur.
Providing attorneys of color mechanisms for reporting incidents of
bias, which often do not rise to the level needed to file private
rights of action, allows the attorneys to exercise the voice necessary
to combat the development of feelings of marginalization that can
increase feelings of discontent towards the firm and the legal pro-
fession more generally.
Permitting mediation through the hearing committee would en-
courage attorneys of color to get the guidance they need to ensure
that they address issues as they arise, while providing firms an op-
portunity to address problems anonymously before being outed as
an organization with diversity issues to the legal community and to
current and potential clients.313 Moreover, the ability to resolve
problems anonymously would encourage equity partners at the firm
to participate in the hearing and make the changes necessary to
avoid similar complaints in the future so that they can avoid a pub-
lic reprimand.314 The guidance provided to the firm would enable it
to have an outside perspective on issues that are preventing the
firm from achieving its goal to increase the demographic diversity
within its attorney ranks. Hopefully, firms would see this as a
benefit.
313. The mere existence of an additional regime for lodging complaints may act as a
deterrent to discriminatory conduct within the firm, much like Title VII acts as a deterrent
for discriminatory behavior on behalf of employers. However, because the proposed regime
would allow complaints that do not rise to the level necessary to file a private right of action
under Title VII, the proposal would deter a different set of behavior.
314. One major objection is that this proposal is essentially a mandate for large law firms
and individual attorneys accused of bias because they cannot opt out of the hearing commit-
tee’s decision to investigate a complaint, although they could refuse to participate fully in the
investigation. If anything, this Article has demonstrated that the set of choice architects nec-
essary to create the incentives needed to ensure greater demographic diversity within firms
goes far beyond an individual law firm management committee. The incentives must also
come from outside sources, like clients, NALP, and, in this instance, the state bar. Moreover,
while the hearing is not voluntary, choosing how to address the guidance received from the
committee would remain in the sole discretion of the individual legal department receiving
such guidance. The guidance might encourage future action, but it would not mandate it.
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There are, however, structural constraints that could limit the ef-
fectiveness of this proposal. First, many believe that the state
disciplinary systems are severely lacking in competency and trans-
parency.315 Second, the state disciplinary system is often perceived
as engaging in rampant under-enforcement of lawyer discipline.316
Third, attorneys at large law firms are rarely subjected to profes-
sional discipline, and the firms themselves are not sanctioned
generally.317
In addition to these structural concerns, attorneys of color may
be reluctant to bring forth complaints due to fear of reprisal from
current or prospective employers. Moreover, it could be considered
draconian to grant state hearing committees the authority to inves-
tigate and reprimand legal departments. Additionally, there may be
concerns that a complaining attorney may attempt to utilize the
ABA’s opinion or the hearing committee’s finding of bias as evi-
dence in a subsequent lawsuit. Finally, private adjudicatory regimes
deprive the public of their right to information.
These are valid concerns, but they do not obfuscate the impor-
tance of the legal profession initiating its own procedures to
combat discrimination:
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other
professions also have been granted powers of self-government,
the legal profession is unique in this respect because of the
close relationship between the profession and the processes of
government and law enforcement. . . .
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their profes-
sional calling, the occasion for government regulation is
obviated.318
The legal profession is uniquely situated within society. The law
has the ability to oppress and the ability to free. At times it pro-
motes justice and fairness, yet it is often callous in its treatment of
the layperson and the minority. It is entirely reasonable for lawyers
to utilize self-regulation to combat the structures of inequity that
315. Debra Moss Curtis, Attorney Discipline Nationwide: A Comparative Analysis of Process and
Statistics, 35 J. LEGAL PROF. 209, 333 (2011) (discussing rankings of state discipline and noting
only three states have the highest ranking of a B- and the balance of the states have C’s and
D’s).
316. See Brown & Wolf, supra note 312, at 254.
317. This is in part because wronged clients of large law firms have a tendency to sue for
malpractice instead of initiating disciplinary proceedings. See Douglas Richmond, Law Firm
Partners as Their Brothers’ Keepers, 96 KY. L.J. 231, 261 (2008).
318. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 10-11 (2007).
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permeate throughout the profession. It is cowardice on the part of
lawyers to expect another body to fulfill this function on lawyers’
behalf. That is not to say this proposal should be entered into
lightly or casually. Deliberate time, effort, and reflection must ac-
company any change of this magnitude, and the input of
individuals throughout the profession would be invaluable to the
process of establishing this type of change. In this circumstance,
where the profession has known, observed, and tracked its system-
atic exclusion and inequity for entire demographic groups for
literally decades, it would seem bold action is both appropriate and
necessary.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that the retention rates of black and Hispanic
attorneys at elite, large law firms can be improved through a series
of soft incentives aimed at encouraging white males, the majority of
equity partners, to become more involved in mentoring and train-
ing demographically diverse attorneys. This mentoring and training
will lead to black and Hispanic attorneys developing a sense of loy-
alty to the firm, which will in turn encourage the attorneys to
express displeasure when dissatisfactory events occur instead of im-
mediately turning to the exit option and leaving the firm.
Specifically, this Article argues that providing billable hours
credit for time spent on diversity initiatives will, over the long term,
change the culture at the firm and make it the norm for white men
to participate in diversity initiatives, which will encourage greater
interaction between white males and other demographic groups. In
addition, the Article argues that CDOs, persons of color, and fe-
male equity partners should be included on top firm committees
because their membership will help to create policies and proce-
dures that will increase demographic diversity throughout the
organization. Finally, this Article argues that the ABA should de-
velop a reporting mechanism for bias-related incidents and that it
should encourage states to expand the scope of authority for disci-
plinary hearing committees to include investigating and mediating
reports of bias in legal departments. The hope is that these addi-
tional avenues for reporting bias will encourage attorneys to
express their dissatisfaction when bias-related incidents occur in-
stead of choosing to exit the law firm.
Fighting discrimination is much more about winning hearts than
mandating minds or behavior, making these proposals, while not
perfect or without limitations, beneficial in that they constitute
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small incentives that, if implemented, could effectuate real change
within elite, large law firms. They can assist law firms in their efforts
aimed at Retaining Color.
